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The Mincer earnings function is the cornerstone of a large literature in empirical economics. This
paper discusses the theoretical foundations of the Mincer model and examines the empirical support
for it using data from Decennial Censuses and Current Population Surveys. While data from 1940
and 1950 Censuses provide some support for Mincer's model, data from later decades are
inconsistent with it. We examine the importance of relaxing functional form assumptions in
estimating internal rates of return to schooling and of accounting for taxes, tuition, nonlinearity in
schooling, and nonseparability between schooling and work experience. Inferences about trends in
rates of return to high school and college obtained from our more general model differ substantially
from inferences drawn from estimates based on a Mincer earnings regression. Important differences
also arise between cohort-based and cross-sectional estimates of the rate of return to schooling. In
the recent period of rapid technological progress, widely used cross-sectional applications of the
Mincer model produce dramatically biased estimates of cohort returns to schooling. We also
examine the implications of accounting for uncertainty and agent expectation formation. Even when
the static framework of Mincer is maintained, accounting for uncertainty substantially affects the
return estimates. Considering the sequential resolution of uncertainty over time in a dynamic setting
gives rise to option values, which fundamentally changes the analysis of schooling decisions. In the
presence of sequential resolution of uncertainty and option values, the internal rate of return - a
cornerstone of classical human capital theory - is not a useful guide to policy analysis.
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Jacob Mincer￿s model of earnings (1974) is a cornerstone of empirical economics. It is
the framework used to estimate returns to schooling,1 r e t u r n st os c h o o l i n gq u a l i t y , 2 and
to measure the impact of work experience on male-female wage gaps.3 It is the basis
for economic studies of education in developing countries4 and has been estimated using
data from a variety of countries and time periods. Recent studies in economic growth use
the Mincer model to analyze the relationship between growth and average schooling levels
across countries.5
In one equation, Mincer￿s framework captures two distinct economic concepts: (a) a
pricing equation or hedonic wage function revealing how the labor market rewards produc-
tive attributes like schooling and work experience and (b) the rate of return to schooling
which can be compared with the interest rate to determine optimality of human capital
investments. Assuming stationarity of the economic environment, the analyst can use the
Mincer model to identify both skill prices and rates of return to investment. This happy
coincidence only occurs under special conditions, which were approximately valid in the
1960 Census data used by Mincer (1974). Unfortunately, these conditions have been at
odds with data ever since. As a result, the widely used Mincer model applied to more
recent data does not provide valid estimates of returns to schooling, nor do related studies
that associate a rising college - high school wage diﬀerential with an increase in the return
to schooling. (See, e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1992, Katz and Murphy, 1992, Katz and Autor,
1999.)
A large literature refers to the coeﬃcient on schooling in an earnings regression as a
rate of return to schooling without stating the conditions under which this interpretation is
valid. This approach to estimating returns has been a main vehicle used to document the
rise in returns to schooling over the past twenty years. Yet, it neglects major determinants
of actual returns, such as the direct and indirect costs of schooling, taxes, length of work-
ing life, and uncertainty about future returns at the time schooling decisions are made.
1See, e.g., Psachoropoulus (1981), Willis (1986), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse
(1998), Smith and Welch (1989), Krueger (1993).
2See Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Card and Krueger (1992).
3See Mincer and Polachek (1974).
4See Glewwe (2002).
5See Bils and Klenow (2000).2
Additionally, while some widely cited studies point out that educational wage diﬀerentials
vary over the lifecycle and that the pattern for earnings-experience-schooling relationships
has changed over time (e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1992, Katz and Murphy, 1992, Katz and
Autor, 1999), these studies oﬀer little guidance in mapping those diﬀerentials into a rate
of return measure that can be used to study educational decisions or policy.
This paper makes the following points. (1) Building on the analysis of Willis (1986), we
present conditions under which the coeﬃcient on schooling in a Mincer earnings function
estimates the rate of return to schooling, assuming stationarity of the economic environment
and perfect certainty. (2) Using Census data for the years 1940 - 1990, we test these
conditions and reject them, even in the 1960 Census data used in the original Mincer
analysis. (3) We develop an alternative nonparametric method to estimate rates of return
to schooling that does not rely on the Mincer model. (4) Using our method, we estimate
internal rates of return to school (i.e. the discount rate that equates the present value of two
earnings streams associated with diﬀerent schooling levels) that diﬀer substantially in both
levels and time trends from estimates based on the Mincer earnings equation. Although
the empirical literature has focused on neglect of higher order terms in experience as a
major source of misspeci￿cation in the Mincer model (see, e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1990),
we ￿nd that this neglect has only minor consequences for estimated rates of return. Far
more important is relaxing Mincer￿s assumptions of linearity in schooling and separability
between schooling and experience. An interesting by-product of our analysis is the discovery
that the real story of educational returns in the 1980s is not the increase in the returns
to college as emphasized by Katz and Murphy (1992) and others, but rather the increase
in the return to graduating from high school. The ￿oor fell out from the wages of the
unskilled.
(5) We also explore the importance of Mincer￿s stationarity assumptions about the
economic environment, and allow lifecycle earnings-education-experience pro￿les to diﬀer
across cohorts. In this case, cross sections are no longer useful guides to the lifecycle earn-
ings or schooling returns of any particular individual. Accounting for the nonstationarity
of earnings over time has empirically important eﬀects on estimated rates of return to
schooling.
(6) We relax the implicit assumption of perfect certainty about future earnings streams
associated with diﬀerent schooling levels that underlies Mincer￿s model. We ￿rst consider3
a model of uncertainty in a static setup without any updating of information. Accounting
for uncertainty in this way substantially reduces estimated internal rates of return to more
plausible levels. The resulting estimates are consistent with the qualitative conclusions of
a model that ignores uncertainty.
We then propose a substantial break from Mincer￿s approach by allowing for the sequen-
tial resolution of uncertainty. That is, with each additional year of schooling, information
about the value of diﬀerent schooling choices and opportunities becomes available generat-
ing an option value of schooling.6 Completing high school generates the option to attend
college and attending college generates the option to complete college. Our ￿ndings suggest
that part of the economic return to ￿nishing high school or attending college includes the
potential for completing college and securing the high rewards associated with a college de-
gree. Both the sequential resolution of uncertainty and non-linearity in returns to schooling
contribute to sizeable option values.
Accounting for option values challenges the validity of a major empirical tool used in
human capital theory since the seminal work of Becker (1964) ￿ the internal rate of return.
When the schooling decision is made at the beginning of life and age-earnings streams across
schooling levels are known and cross only once, then the internal rate of return (IRR) can be
compared with the interest rate as a valid rule for making education decisions (Hirschleifer,
1970). When schooling decisions are made sequentially as information is revealed, a number
of problems arise that invalidate this rule. We examine these problems and the empirical
role that option values play in determining rates of return to schooling. Our analysis points
to a need for more empirical studies that incorporate the sequential nature of individual
schooling decisions and uncertainty about education costs and future earnings to help
determine their importance.
This paper does not examine the implicit assumption of the Mincer model that school-
ing is exogenous. This assumption has been challenged elsewhere. See Griliches (1977),
Willis and Rosen (1979), Willis (1986), Card (1995, 1999), Heckman and Vytlacil (1998,
2003), and Carneiro, et al. (2001). Unfortunately, the current empirical debate on the im-
portance of accounting for the endogeneity of schooling is far from settled. The instruments
6Weisbrod (1962) developed the concept of the option value of education. For one formalization of his
analysis, see Comay, Melnik and Pollatschek (1973). The dynamic schooling model of Keane and Wolpin
(1997) also implicitly incorporates option values.4
used in this literature have been seriously challenged (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002), and
the Census data used in this paper yield large samples but few instruments. This paper
uses these data to examine other, neglected, aspects of the Mincer model. Assumptions
about the functional form of the earnings function, the consequences of tuition and taxes,
uncertainty, and stability of the economic environment have been largely neglected in the
empirical literature. This paper ￿lls that void by systematically analyzing these issues,
maintaining the exogeneity of schooling like most of the literature following Mincer (See,
e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992, and Katz and Autor, 1999).
This paper proceeds in the following way. Section 3 reviews two distinct theoretical
foundations for the Mincer model that are often confused. Section three presents empirical
evidence on the validity of the Mincer speci￿cation. Using nonparametric estimation tech-
niques, we formally test (and reject) key assumptions of Mincer￿s model. In Section four,
we develop an alternative nonparametric approach that allows for income taxes, college tu-
ition, and length of working life that may depend on the amount of schooling. We explore
the empirical importance of assumptions that are needed to equate the Mincer schooling
coeﬃcient with the internal rate of return to schooling, and provide estimates of the return
that take into account more general earnings functions, taxes, tuition, and a varying length
of working life. We also consider the impact of allowing for uncertainty in a static decision
framework.
Section ￿ve considers the interpretation of Mincer regression estimates based on cross-
section data in a changing economy. We contrast cross-sectional estimates with those based
on repeated cross-sections drawn from the CPS that follow cohorts over time.
In Section six, we introduce a framework with sequential resolution of uncertainty and
an option value of schooling. We discuss why the internal rate of return is no longer a valid
g u i d et os c h o o l i n gi n v e s t m e n t si nt h i se n v i r o n m e n ta n da r g u et h a ta n o t h e rm e a s u r eo ft h e
rate of return used in modern capital theory is more appropriate. Section seven concludes.
2 The Theoretical Foundations of Mincer￿s Earnings
Regression
The Mincer (1958, 1974) model speci￿es
ln[w(s,x)] = α0 + ρss + β0x + β1x
2 + ε (1)5
where w(s,x) is wage at schooling level s and work experience x, ρs is the ￿rate of return to
schooling￿ (assumed to be the same for all schooling levels) and ε is a mean zero residual
with E(ε|s,x)=0 . This model is motivated by two conceptually diﬀerent theoretical
frameworks, which we brie￿y review in this section.
2.1 The compensating diﬀerences model of Mincer (1958)
The ￿rst Mincer model (1958) uses the principle of compensating diﬀerences to explain
why persons with diﬀerent levels of schooling receive diﬀerent earnings over their lifetimes.
This model assumes that individuals have identical abilities and opportunities, that there is
perfect certainty, that credit markets are perfect, that the environment is perfectly certain,
but that occupations diﬀer in the amount of training required. Schooling is costly because
individuals forego earnings while in school, but it entails no direct costs. Because individuals
are assumed to be ex ante identical, they require a compensating diﬀerential to work in
occupations that require a longer training period. The size of the compensating diﬀerential
is determined by equating the present value of earnings streams net of costs associated with
diﬀerent levels of investment.
Let w(s) represent the annual earnings of an individual with s years of education,
assumed to be constant over his lifetime. Let r be an externally determined interest rate
and T the length of working life, which is assumed not to depend on s. The present value











An equilibrium characterized by heterogeneous schooling choices requires that individ-
uals be indiﬀerent between schooling levels. Allocations of people to diﬀerent schooling
levels are driven by demand conditions. Equating the earnings streams associated with
diﬀerent schooling levels and taking logs yields
lnw(s)=l nw(0) + ln((1 − e
−rt)/(1 − e
−r(T−s))) + rs.
The second term on the right-hand-side is an adjustment for ￿nite life, which converges to
zero as T gets large.7
7This term also disappears if the retirement age, T, is allowed to increase one-for-one with s.6
Mincer (1958) observed that this simple framework yields a number of interesting im-
plications: (i) For large T, the coeﬃcient on years of schooling in a Mincer regression
equals the interest rate, r, (ii) people with more education receive higher earnings, (iii) the
diﬀerence between earnings levels of people with diﬀerent years of schooling is increasing
in the interest rate and age of retirement, and (iv) the ratio of earnings for persons with
education levels diﬀering by a ￿xed number of years is roughly constant across schooling
levels.
If we de￿ne the internal rate of return to schooling as the discount rate that equates the
lifetime earnings streams for diﬀerent education choices, then the internal rate of return
equals the interest rate, r. Combined with implication (i), the coeﬃcient on years of school-
ing in a Mincer regression yields an estimate of the internal rate of return. This coeﬃcient
also re￿ects the percentage increase in lifetime earnings associated with an additional year
of school when T is large.
2.2 Mincer￿s (1974) accounting-identity model
Mincer￿s (1974) second model is motivated by entirely diﬀerent assumptions from his earlier
model, but it yields an earnings speci￿cation similar to that of the ￿rst. The second model
b u i l d so na na c c o u n t i n gi d e n t i t ym o d e ld e v e l o p e di nB e c k e r( 1 9 6 4 )a n dB e c k e r - C h i s w i c k
(1966). Unlike the ￿rst model, the second model focuses on the life-cycle dynamics of
earnings and on the relationship between observed earnings, potential earnings, and human
capital investment, both in terms of formal schooling and on-the-job investment. At the
same time, no explicit assumptions are made about the background economic environment.
Mincer (1974) writes observed earnings as a function of potential earnings net of human
capital investment costs, where potential earnings in any time period depend on investments
in previous time periods. Let Et be potential earnings at time t. Investments in training
can be expressed as a fraction of potential earnings invested, i.e. Ct = ktEt, where kt is
the fraction invested at time t.L e tρt b et h er e t u r nt ot r a i n i n gi n v e s t m e n t sm a d ea tt i m e
t. Then,
Et+1 = Et + Ctρt = Et(1 + ktρt).
Repeated substitution yields Et =
Qt−1
j=0(1 + ρjkj)E0.
Formal schooling is de￿ned as years spent in full-time investment (kt =1 ) . Assume that7
the rate of return on formal schooling is constant for all years of schooling (ρt = ρs)a n d
that formal schooling takes place at the beginning of life. Also assume the rate of return
to post-school investment, ρt,i sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m ea n de q u a l sρ0. Then, we can write




which yields the approximate relationship (for small ρs and ρ0 )




To establish a relationship between potential earnings and years of labor market expe-
rience, Mincer (1974) approximates the Ben Porath (1967) model and further assumes a








where x = t − s ≥ 0 i st h ea m o u n to fw o r ke x p e r i e n c ea so fa g et. The length of working
life, T, is assumed to be independent of years of schooling. Under these assumptions, the
relationship between potential earnings, schooling and experience is given by:











Observed earnings equal potential earnings less investment costs, producing the follow-
ing relationship for observed earnings:




















= α0 + ρss + β0x + β1x
2.
Thus, we arrive at the standard form of the Mincer earnings model (equation (1)) that
regresses log earnings on a constant term, a linear term in years of schooling, and linear
and quadratic terms in years of labor market experience.
In most applications of the Mincer model, it is assumed that the intercept and slope
coeﬃcients in equation (1) are identical across persons. This implicitly assumes that E0, κ,
ρ0 and ρs are the same across persons and do not depend on the schooling level. However,8
Mincer formulates a more general model that allows for the possibility that κ and ρs diﬀer
across persons, which produces a random coeﬃcient model
lnw(si,x i)=α0i + ρsisi + β0ixi + β1ix
2
i + εi
Letting α0 = E(α0i), ρs = E(ρsi), β0 = E(β0i), E(β1i)=β1,w em a yw r i t et h i s
expression as
lnw(s,x)=α0 +ρss+β0x+β1x
2 +[(α0i −α0)+(ρsi −ρs)s+( β0i −β0)x+( β1i −β1)x
2],
where the terms in brackets are part of the error.8 Mincer initially assumes that (α0i −
α0),(ρsi − ρs),(β0i − β0),(β1i − β1) are independent of (s,x); although he relaxes this
assumption in later work (Mincer, 1997).
Implications for log earnings-age and log earnings-experience pro￿les and for
the interpersonal distribution of life-cycle earnings
Mincer derives several implications from the accounting identity model under diﬀerent
assumptions about the relationship between formal schooling and post-school investment
patterns. Under the assumption that post-school investment patterns are identical across






T > 0. These two conditions imply:
( i )l o g - e a r n i n g se x p e r i e n c ep r o ￿les are parallel across schooling levels, and
(ii) log-earnings age pro￿les diverge with age across schooling levels.
Mincer (1974) presents informal empirical support for both of these implications of the
model using cross-sectional data from the 1960 Decennial Census. In Section 3, we extend
his analysis to more Census cross sections and show that the data from the 1940-1950
Censuses provide some empirical support for patterns (i) and (ii). The 1960 and 1970 data
are roughly consistent with the model, but pattern (i) does not pass conventional statistical
tests. Data from the more recent Census years are much less supportive of Mincer￿s model.
The framework described above also has important implications for understanding how
individual earnings patterns vary with population averages at each age in the life-cycle.
8In the random coeﬃcients model, the error term of the derived regression equation is heteroskedastic.9
One implication is that for each schooling class, there is an age in the life-cycle at which
the interpersonal variance in earnings is minimized. Consider the accounting identity for










Interpersonal diﬀerences in observed earnings of individuals with the same E0 and ρs arise
because of diﬀerences in lnEs and in post-school investment patterns as determined by
kj.W h e nlnEs and κ (from equation 2) are uncorrelated, it can be shown that the vari-
ance of log earnings is minimized when experience is approximately equal to 1/ρ0.( S e e
the derivation in Appendix A.) At this experience level, variance in earnings is solely a
consequence of diﬀerences in schooling levels or ability and is unrelated to diﬀerences in
post-school investment behavior. Prior to and after this time period (often referred to as the
￿overtaking age￿), there is an additional source of variance due to diﬀerences in post-school
investment. As discussed by Mincer (1974), this yields another important implication that
c a nb ee x a m i n e di nt h ed a t a ,n a m e l y :
(iii) the variance of earnings over the life-cycle has a U-shaped pattern
Below, we show that this prediction of the model is supported in Census data from both
early and recent decades.9
3 Empirical Evidence for the Mincer Model
We now examine the empirical support for three key implications of Mincer￿s accounting
identity model given above by (i), (ii),a n d(iii). We extend Mincer￿s (1974) analysis
of subsamples of white males from the 1960 decennial U.S. census to include both white
and black males from the 1940-1990 decennial Censuses. Earnings correspond to annual
earnings, which includes both wage and salary income and business income.10
9In addition to Mincer (1974), studies by Schultz (1975), Smith and Welch (1979), Hause (1980), and
Dooley and Gottschalk (1984) also provide evidence of this pattern for wages and earnings.
10Business income is not available in the 1940 Census. Appendix B provides detailed information on the
construction of our data subsamples and variables.10
Figure 1 presents nonparametric estimates of the experience - log earnings pro￿les for
each of the Census years for white and black males. Analogous estimates of the age - log
earnings pro￿les are shown for 1940, 1960, and 1980 in Figure 2. Nonparametric local
linear regression is used to generate the estimates.11 The estimated pro￿les for white males
from the 1940-1970 Censuses generally support the fanning-out by age and the parallelism
by experience patterns (implications (i) and (ii) above) predicted by Mincer￿s accounting
identity model. For black males, the patterns are less clear, partly due to the order of
magnitude smaller sample sizes which result in less precise estimates. For 1960 and 1970,
when the sample sizes of black males are much larger relative to earlier years, experience
-l o ge a r n i n g sp r o ￿les for black males show convergence across education levels over the
life-cycle.
Earnings-experience pro￿les for the 1980-1990 Censuses show convergence for both
white and black males. Thus, while data from the 1940-1950 Censuses provide support
for implications (i) and (ii) of Mincer￿s model, the evidence for implication (i) is weaker
for 1960 and 1970. The data from 1980 and 1990 do not support the model.12 Formal
statistical tests, reported in Table 1, reject the hypothesis of parallel experience - log earn-
ings pro￿les for whites during all years except 1940 and 1950. Thus, even in the 1960 data
used by Mincer, we reject parallelism. For black males, parallelism is only rejected in 1990,
although the samples are much smaller. (The formulae for the test statistics are given in
Appendix C.)
Figure 3 examines the support for implication (iii)￿a U-shaped variance in earnings￿
for three diﬀerent schooling completion levels: eighth grade, 12th grade, and college (16
years of school). For the 1940 Census year, the variance of log-earnings over the life-cycle
is relatively ￿at for whites. It is similarly ￿at in 1950, with the exception of increasing
variance at the tails. However, data for black and white men from the 1960-1990 Censuses
clearly exhibit the U-shaped pattern predicted by Mincer￿s accounting-identity model.13
Table 2 reports standard cross-section regression estimates of the Mincer return to
11Details about the nonparametric estimation procedure are given in Appendix C. The bandwidth para-
meter is equal to 5 years. Estimates are not very sensitive to changes in the bandwidth parameter in the
range of 3-10 years.
12Murphy and Welch (1992) also document diﬀerences in earnings-experience pro￿l e sa c r o s se d u c a t i o n
levels using data from the 1964-1990 Current Population Surveys.
13For the sake of brevity, only a subset of years are shown in the ￿gures. Figures for 1950, 1970, and
1990 are available from the authors upon request.11
schooling for all Census years derived from earnings speci￿cation (1). The estimates in-
dicate a rate of return to schooling of around 10-13% for white men and 9-15% for black
men over the 1940-90 period. While estimated coeﬃcients on schooling tend to be lower for
blacks than whites in the early decades, they are higher in 1980 and 1990. The estimates
suggest that the rate of return to schooling for blacks increased substantially over the 50
year period, while it ￿rst declined and then rose for whites. The coeﬃcient on experience
rose for both whites and blacks over the ￿ve decades. At the same time, earnings pro-
￿l e sh a v eb e c o m em o r ec o n c a v ea sr e ￿ected in the increasingly more negative estimated
coeﬃcients for experience squared.
4 Estimating Rates of Return
Under the assumptions invoked in the compensating diﬀerentials model described in Section
2, the coeﬃcient on schooling equals both the real interest rate and the internal rate of
return to schooling. The coeﬃcient on schooling in an accounting identity model can also
be interpreted as an average rate of return. These observations have led many economists
to label that coeﬃcient the ￿Mincer rate of return,￿ and a large empirical literature focuses
on its estimation.
In this section, we explore what earnings equations estimate within a simple income
maximizing framework under perfect certainty developed in Rosen (1977) and Willis (1986).
We assume that individuals choose education levels to maximize their present value of
lifetime earnings, as in Mincer￿s compensating diﬀerences model, taking as given a post-
school earnings pro￿le, which may be determined through on-the-job investment as in
the accounting-identity model. The model analyzed in this section relaxes many of the
assumptions that were imposed in the models of Section 2, such as the restriction that log
earnings increase linearly with schooling and the restriction that log earnings-experience
pro￿les are parallel across schooling classes. We also incorporate additional features, such as
school tuition and nonpecuniary costs of schooling, income taxes, and a length of working
life that may depend on the schooling level. When these features are incorporated, the
coeﬃcient from a Mincer regression need no longer equal the real interest rate (the rate of
return on capital). It also loses its interpretation as the internal rate of return to schooling.
Therefore, instead of ￿tting Mincer equations, we estimate rates of returns by a procedure12
applied in Hanoch (1967), which is further described below.
Let w(s,x) be wage income at experience level x for schooling level s; T(s),t h el a s ta g e
of earnings, which may depend on the schooling level; v, private tuition and non-pecuniary
costs of schooling; τ, a proportional income tax rate; and r, the before-tax interest rate.14











The ￿rst order condition for a maximum yields
[T
0(s) − 1]e











dx − v/(1 − τ)=0 . (4)
De￿ning ￿ r =( 1− τ)r (the after-tax interest rate) and re-arranging terms yields
￿ r =

























Term 1 represents a life-earnings eﬀect ￿ the change in the present value of earnings due
to a change in working-life associated with additional schooling (expressed as a fraction of
the present value of earnings measured at age s). Term 2 is the weighted eﬀect of schooling
14The standard framework implicitly assumes that individuals know these functional relationships, credit
markets are perfect, education does not enter preferences, and there is no uncertainty.
15This expression embodies an institutional feature of the U.S. economy where income from all sources
is taxed but one cannot write-oﬀ tuition and non-pecuniary costs of education. However, we assume that
agents can write-oﬀ interest on their loans. This assumption is consistent with the institutional feature
that persons can deduct mortgage interest, that 70% of American families own their own homes, and that
mortgage loans can be used to ￿nance college education.13
on log earnings by experience, and Term 3 is the cost of tuition expressed as a fraction of
lifetime income measured at age s.
The special case assumed by Mincer (and most labor economists) writes v =0(or
assumes that the third term is negligible) and T0(s)=1(no private tuition costs and no












As described in Section two, Mincer￿s model further imposes multiplicative separability
between the schooling and experience components of earnings, so w(s,x)=µ(s)ϕ(x) (i.e.
log earnings pro￿les are parallel in experience across schooling levels). In this special case,
￿ r = µ0(s)/µ(s).I f t h i s h o l d s f o r a l l s, then wage growth must be log linear in schooling
and µ(s)=µ(0)eρss. If all of these assumptions hold, then the coeﬃcient on schooling in a
Mincer equation (ρs) estimates the internal rate of return to schooling, which should equal
the after-tax interest rate.
>From equation (5) we observe, more generally, that the diﬀerence between after-tax
interest rates and the Mincer coeﬃcient can be composed of three parts: a life-earnings
part (Term 1), a second part which depends on the structure of the schooling return over
the lifecycle, and a tuition cost part (Term 3). The second part is the diﬀerence between
Term 2 averaged over all schooling and experience categories and the Mincer rate of return
estimated from equation (1). It re￿ects deviations from linearity of log earnings in schooling
and parallelism in experience pro￿les across education levels.
The evidence for 1980 and 1990 described in Section 3 argues strongly against the
assumption of multiplicative separability of log earnings in schooling and experience. In
recent decades, log earnings-experience pro￿les diﬀer across schooling groups. In addition,
college tuition costs are nontrivial and are not oﬀset by work in school for most college
students. These factors account for some of the observed disparities between the after-tax
interest rate and the steady-state Mincer coeﬃcient. Finally, the least squares estimate
obtained from a standard Mincer regression does not control for variation in the ability
of persons attending college, so classical ability bias could also partly account for the
disparity.16
16The evidence on the importance of ability bias is mixed. See, e.g. Griliches (1977), Card (1995),14
One can view ￿ r as a marginal internal rate of return to schooling after incorporating
tuition costs, earnings increases, and changes in the retirement age. That is, ￿ r is the
d i s c o u n tr a t et h a te q u a t e st h en e tl i f e t i m ee a r n i n g sf o rm a r g i n a l l yd i ﬀerent schooling levels
at an optimum. As in the model of Mincer (1958), this internal rate of return should equal
the interest rate in a world with perfect credit markets, once all costs and bene￿ts from
schooling are considered.
After allowing for taxes, tuition, variable length of working life, and a ￿exible relation-
ship between earnings, schooling and experience, the coeﬃcient on years of schooling in
a log earnings regression no longer equals the internal rate of return. However, it is still
possible to calculate the internal rate of return using the observation that it is the discount
rate that equates lifetime earnings streams for two diﬀerent schooling levels (Becker, 1964,
states this logic. Hanoch, 1967, applies it). Typically, internal rates of return are based on
non-marginal diﬀerences in schooling. Incorporating tuition and taxes, the internal rate of


















As with ￿ r above, rI will equal the Mincer coeﬃcient on schooling under the assumptions of
parallelism over experience across schooling categories (i.e. w(s,x)=µ(s)ϕ(x)), linearity
of log earnings in schooling (µ(s)=µ(0)eρss), no tuition costs (v =0 ), no taxes (τ =0 ),
and equal work-lives irrespective of years of schooling (T0(s)=1 ).17 In the next section, we
compare rate of return estimates based on speci￿cation (1) to those obtained by directly
solving for rI(s1,s 2) in equation (6).
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro, et.al (2001) and Carneiro (2002). The evidence reported in
Cawley, et.al (2000) demonstrates that fundamental identi￿cation problems plague studies of the eﬀect of
ability on earnings.
17When tuition costs are negligible, proportional taxes on earnings will have no eﬀect on estimated
internal rates of return, because they reduce earnings at the same rate regardless of educational choices.15
4.1 How model speci￿cations and accounting for taxes and tu-
ition aﬀect internal rate of return (IRR) estimates
Using data for white and black men from 1940-90 decennial Censuses, we examine how
internal rate of return (IRR) estimates change when diﬀerent assumptions about the model
are relaxed. Tables 3a and 3b report internal rates of return to schooling for each Census
year and for a variety of pairwise schooling level comparisons for white and black men,
respectively.18 These estimates assume that workers spend 47 years working irrespective
of their educational choice (i.e. a high school graduate works until age 65 and a college
graduate until 69). Initially, the only assumptions we relax are functional form assumptions
on the earnings equation, and we ignore taxes and tuition. To calculate each of the IRR
estimates, we ￿rst estimate a log wage equation under the assumptions indicated in the
tables. Then, we predict earnings under this speci￿cation for the ￿rst 47 years of experience,
and the IRR is taken to be the root of equation (6).19 As a benchmark, the ￿rst row
for each year reports the IRR estimate obtained from the Mincer speci￿cation for log
wages (equation (1)). The IRR could equivalently be obtained from a Mincer regression
coeﬃcient.20
Relative to the Mincer speci￿cation, row 2 relaxes the assumption of linearity in school-
ing by including indicator variables for each year of schooling. This modi￿cation leads to
substantial diﬀerences in the estimated rate of return to schooling, especially for schooling
levels associated with degree completion years (12 and 16) which now show much larger
returns than other schooling years. For example, the IRR to ￿nishing high school is 30%
for white men in 1970, while the rate of return to ￿nishing 10 rather than 8 years of school
is only 3%. In general, imposing linearity in schooling leads to upward biased estimates of
the rate of return to grades that do not produce a degree, while it leads to downward biased
estimates of the degree completion years (high school or college). Sheepskin eﬀects are an
important feature of the data.21 There is a considerable body of evidence against linearity.
18As lower schooling levels are reported only in broader intervals in the 1990 Census, we can only compare
6 years against 10 years and cannot compare 6 years against 8 years or 8 against 10 years as we do for
the earlier Census years. We assume the private cost to elementary and high school is zero in all the
calculations.
19Strictly speaking, we solve for the root of the discrete time analog of equation (6).
20They would be identically equal if our internal rate of return calculations were computed in continuous
time. Because we use discrete time to calculate internal rates of return, rI = eρs−1, which is approximately
equal to ρs when it is small.
21We use the term ￿sheepskin eﬀects￿ to refer to exceptionally large rates of return at degree granting16
(See e.g. Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995, Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd, 1996, Jaeger
and Page, 1996, Solon and Hungerford, 1987.) Row 3 relaxes both linearity in schooling
and the quadratic speci￿cation for experience, which produces similar estimates. The as-
sumption that earnings are quadratic in experience is empirically innocuous for estimating
returns to schooling once linearity and separability are relaxed.
Finally, row 4 fully relaxes all three Mincer assumptions (i.e. earnings are non-parametrically
estimated as a function of experience, separately within each schooling class, which does
not impose any assumption other than continuity on the functional earnings-experience
relationship). Comparing these results with those of row three provides a measure of the
bias induced by assuming separability of earnings in schooling and experience. In many
cases, especially in recent decades, there are large diﬀerences. This ￿nding is consistent
with the results reported in Section 3, which showed that earnings pro￿les in recent decades
are no longer parallel in experience across schooling categories.
The estimates in Table 3a show a large increase in the return to completing high school
for whites, which goes from 24% in 1940 to 50% in 1990, and even more dramatic increases
for blacks (Table 3b). It is possible that these increases partially re￿ect a selection eﬀect,
stemming from a decrease in the average quality of workers over time who drop out of
high school.22 There is also a signi￿cant increase over time in the marginal internal rate of
return to 14 years and 16 years of school, consistent with changes in the demand for labor
favoring skilled workers. The Mincer coeﬃcient implies a much lower return to schooling
than do the nonparametric estimates, with an especially large disparity for the return to
high school completion. For whites, the return to a 4-year college degree is similar under
the Mincer and nonparametric models, but for blacks the Mincer coeﬃcient understates
the return by about 10%. While the recent literature has focused on the rising returns to
college, the increase in returns to completing high school has been substantially greater.
A comparison of the IRR estimates based on the most ￿exible model for black males
and white males shows that for all years except 1940, the return to high school completion
is higher for black males, reaching a peak of 58% in 1990 (compared with 50% for whites
in 1990). The internal rate of return to completing 16 years is also higher for blacks, by
years of schooling. We cannot, however, distinguish in the Census data which individuals receive a diploma
a m o n gi n d i v i d u a l sr e p o r t i n g1 2o r1 6y e a r so fc o m p l e t e ds c h o o l i n g .
22Though, it is worth noting that the fraction of white men completing high school is relatively stable
after 1970. Among black men, high school graduation rates continued to increase until the early 1980s.17
about 10% in 1990.
Estimated internal rates of return clearly diﬀer depending on the set of assumptions im-
posed by the earnings model. While the assumption that log earnings pro￿les are quadratic
is fairly innocuous, the assumptions of linearity in schooling and separability in schooling
and experience are not. Comparing the unrestricted estimates in row 4 with the Mincer-
based estimates in row 1 reveal substantial diﬀerences for nearly all grade progressions and
all years.
Table 4 examines how the IRR estimates change when we account for income taxes
(both ￿at and progressive) and college tuition.23 For ease of comparison, the ￿rst row
for each year reports estimates of the IRR for the most ￿exible earnings speci￿cation, not
accounting for tuition and taxes. (These estimates are identical to the fourth row in Tables
3a and 3b.) All other rows account for private tuition costs for college (v) assumed equal to
the average college tuition paid in the U.S. that year. The average college tuition paid by
students increased steadily since 1950 as shown in Figure 4a. In 1990, it stood at roughly
$3,500 (in 2000 dollars).24 Row three accounts for ￿at wage taxes using estimates of average
marginal tax rates (τ) from Barro and Sahasakul (1983) and Mulligan and Marion (2000),
which are plotted for each of the years in Figure 4b. Average marginal tax rates increased
from a low of 5.6% in 1940 to a high of 30.4% in 1980 before falling to 23.3% in 1990. The
￿nal row accounts for the progressive nature of our tax system using federal income tax
schedules (Form 1040) for single adults with no dependents and no unearned income. (See
Appendix B for details.)
When costs of schooling alone are taken into account (comparing row 2 with row 1), the
return to college generally falls by a few percentage points. Because the earnings of blacks
are typically lower than for whites but tuition payments are assumed here to be the same,
accounting for tuition costs has a bigger eﬀect on the estimates for the black samples. For
23Because we assume that schooling is free (direct schooling costs are zero) through high school and
because internal rates of return are independent of ￿at taxes when direct costs of schooling are zero,
internal rates of return to primary and secondary school are identical across the ￿rst three speci￿cations
in the table. Empirically, taking into account progressive tax rates has little impact on the estimates for
these school completion levels. (Tables are available upon request.) For these reasons, we only report in
Table 4 the IRR estimates for comparisons of school completion levels 12 and 14, 12 and 16, and 14 and
16.
24Average college tuition was computed by dividing the total tuition and fees revenue in the U.S. by total
college enrollment that year. Federal and state support are not included in these ￿gures. See Appendix A
for further details on the time series we used for both tuition and taxes.18
example, internal rates of return to the ￿nal two years of college decline by about one-fourth
for whites and one-third for blacks. Further accounting for taxes on earnings (rows 3 and
4) has little additional impact on the estimates. Interestingly, the progressive nature of
the tax system typically reduces rates of return by less than a percentage point. Overall,
failure to account for tuition and taxes leads to an overstatement of the return to college.
However, the time trends in the return are fairly similar whether or not one adjusts for
taxes and tuition.
F i g u r e5g r a p h st h et i m et r e n di nt h eI R Rt oh i g hs c h o o lc o m p l e t i o nf o rw h i t ea n db l a c k
males, comparing estimates based on (i) the Mincer model and (ii) the ￿exible nonpara-
metric earnings model accounting for progressive taxes and tuition. Estimates based on
the Mincer speci￿cation tend to understate returns to high school completion and also fail
to capture the substantial rise in returns to schooling that has taken place since 1970. Fur-
thermore, the sizeable disparity in returns by race is not captured by the Mincer equation
estimates.
Figure 6 presents similar estimates for college completion. Again, the Mincer model
yields much lower estimates of the IRR in comparison with the more ￿exible model that
also takes into account taxes and tuition. Nonparametric estimates of the return to college
completion are generally 5-10% higher than the corresponding Mincer-based estimates even
after accounting for taxes and tuition. Additionally, the more general speci￿cation reveals
a substantial decline in the IRR to college between 1950 and 1960 for blacks that is not
re￿ected in the Mincer-based estimates.
Using the ￿exible earnings speci￿cation, we also examine how estimates depend on
assumptions about the length of working life, comparing two extreme cases. Previous
estimates assume that individuals work for 47 years regardless of their schooling (i.e. T0(s)=
1). An alternative assumption posits that workers retire at age 65 regardless of their
education (i.e. T0(s)=0 ). We ￿nd virtually identical results for all years and schooling
comparisons for both assumptions about the schooling - worklife relationship.25 Because
earnings at the end of the life-cycle are heavily discounted, they have little impact on the
total value of lifetime earnings and, therefore, have little eﬀect on internal rate of return
estimates.
25Results available from authors upon request.19
4.2 Accounting for Uncertainty in a Static Version of the Model
We have, thus far, computed internal rates of return using ￿tted values from earnings
speci￿cations. Under Mincer￿s assumptions about the earnings process, when tuition and
taxes are negligible, and the working life is the same across schooling levels, these estimates
correspond directly to the coeﬃcient on schooling in a Mincer regression. This subsection
discusses the interpretation of estimates generated by Mincer￿s strategy and demonstrates
that it makes an implicit assumption about how individuals forecast their earnings. We
suggest other ways to estimate the IRR used by agents in making their schooling choices
that are based on more plausible expectation formation mechanisms.
Full earnings pro￿les for all schooling choices are not known by individuals making
decisions about schooling, so individuals must use some method of predicting their future
earnings. Of course, the same is true for the econometrician calculating internal rates of
return to schooling. As previously discussed, it is common in the literature to use log




Assume for the moment that Mincer￿s assumptions about earnings are correct, so that
equation (1) describes the true earnings process and that E(ε|x,s)=0 .S o f a r ,w e h a v e
estimated internal rates of return using ￿tted values for w in place of the true values. That
is, we use the following estimate for log earnings: ￿ w(s,x)=exp(￿ α0 +￿ ρss + ￿ β0x + ￿ β1x2),
where ￿ α0, ￿ ρs, ￿ β0,a n d￿ β1 are the regression estimates. This procedure implicitly assumes
that when making their schooling choices, individuals take ￿tted earnings pro￿l e sa st h e i r
prediction of their own future earnings, ignoring any potential person-speci￿c deviations.
I no t h e rw o r d s ,w ec a l c u l a t et h eI R Rf o ra ni n d i v i d u a la tt h em e a nv a l u ef o rε (zero) at all
experience and schooling classi￿cations. Thus our IRR estimator ￿ rI solves
∞ X
x=0
￿ w(s + j,x)








(1 + ￿ rI)s+x =0 ,
which is the discrete time analogue to the model of equation (3) for two schooling levels s
and s + j, assuming an in￿nite horizon. When v =0 (no tuition costs), or if tuition costs
are negligible,
plim ￿ rI = e
ρs − 1 ≈ ρs.20
This is an ex ante rate of return.
Suppose instead that agents base their expectations of future earnings at diﬀerent
schooling levels on the mean earnings pro￿les for each schooling level, or on E(w|s,x).












(1 + ￿ rI)s+x =0 (7)
If v =0and Mincer￿s assumptions hold,
eρsj








(1 + ￿ rI)x .
If E[eε(s,x)|s,x]=E[eε(s+j,x)|s,x] for all x, then the two sums are equal and plim ￿ rI =
eρs − 1 as before. In this special case, using ￿ w(s,x)=exp(￿ α0 +￿ ρss + ￿ β0x + ￿ β1x2) or
E(w(s,x)|s,x) will yield estimates of the internal rate of return that are asymptotically
equivalent. However, if E(eε(s+j,x)|s,x) is a more general function of s and x, the estimators
of the ex ante return will diﬀer.
In the more general case, using estimates of E(w(s,x)|s,x) yields an estimated rate of
return with a probability limit
plim ￿ rI = e
ρs [M(s,j)]













This estimator will be larger than ρs if the variability in earnings is greater for more
educated workers (i.e. M(s,j) > 1) and smaller if the variability is greater for less educated
workers (i.e. M(s,j) < 1). If individuals use mean earnings at given schooling levels
in forming the expectations that govern their schooling decisions, this estimator is more
appropriate. Inspection of Figure 3 reveals that, at young ages, the variability in earnings
for low education groups is the highest among all groups. If discounting dominates wage
growth with experience, we would expect that M(s,j) < 1.26
26More generally if v 6=0 ,t h e n￿ rI converges to the root of equation (7). Neglecting this term leads to
an upward bias, as previously discussed.21
These calculations assume that agents are forecasting the unknown ε(s,x) using (s,x).
If they also use another set of variables q, then these calculations are all conditional on q
(￿ rI =￿ rI(q)) and we would have to average over q to obtain the average ex ante rate of
return. If agents know ε(s,x) at the time they make their schooling decisions, then the ex
ante return and the ex post return are the same, and ￿ rI now depends on the full vector of
￿shocks" confronting agents. Returns would then be averaged over the distribution of all
￿shocks" to calculate an expected return. Due to the nonlinearity of the equation used to
calculate the internal rate of return, the rate of return based on an average earnings pro￿le
is not the same as the mean rate of return. Thus, ex ante and ex post mean rates of return
are certain to disagree.
When ρs varies in the population, these results must be further modi￿ed. Assume ρs
varies across individuals, that E(ρs)=ﬂ ρs,a n dt h a tρs is independent of x and ε(s + j,x)
for all x,j. Also, assume v =0for expositional purposes. Using ￿tted earnings, ￿ w(s,x),t o
calculate internal rates of return yields an estimator, ￿ rI,t h a ts a t i s ￿es
plim ￿ rI = e
ﬂ ρs − 1 ≈ ﬂ ρs.
This estimator calculates the ex ante internal rate of return for someone with the mean
increase in annual log earnings ρs =ﬂ ρs and with the mean deviation from the overall
average ε(s,x)=ε(s + j,x)=0for all x.
On the other hand, assuming agents cannot forecast ρs, using estimates of mean earnings
E(w(s,x)|s,x) will yield an estimator for r with
plim ￿ rI = e
ﬂ ρs [kM(s,j)]
1/j − 1 ≈ ﬂ ρs +
1
j
[ n k +  n (s,j)],
where k =
E(e(s+j)(ρs−ﬂ ρs)|s,x)
E(es(ρs−ﬂ ρs)|s,x) and M(s,j) is de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 ) .
For ﬂ ρs > 0, it is straightforward to show that k>1, which implies that everything else
the same, the estimator, ￿ rI, based on mean earnings will be larger when there is variation
in the return to schooling than when there is not. Furthermore, the internal rate of return
is larger for someone with the mean earnings pro￿le than it is for an individual with the
mean value of ρs.A g a i n ,i fa g e n t sk n o wρs, we should compute ￿ rI conditioning on ρs and
construct the mean rate of return from the average of those ￿ rI. Again, the mean ex post
and ex ante rates of return are certain to diﬀer unless there is perfect foresight.22
Table 5 reports estimates of the ex ante IRR based on the earlier estimation strategy
as well as adjusted estimates that use mean earnings within each education and experience
category rather than predicted earnings at ε =0(both the adjusted and unadjusted esti-
mates account for tuition and progressive taxes). The adjusted estimates generate much
lower (and more reasonable) IRR estimates than the unadjusted ones.27
Using mean earnings rather than earnings for someone with the mean residual generally
leads to lower estimated internal rates of return for most schooling comparisons. Thus, even
if the Mincer speci￿cation for log earnings is correct, the internal rate of return guiding
individual decisions is lower than the Mincer estimated rate of return when individuals
base their schooling decisions on average earnings levels within schooling and experience
categories. In other words, predicted earnings obtained using the coeﬃcients from a log
earnings regression evaluated where ε =0is an inaccurate measure of the average earnings
within each schooling and experience category.
The adjustment for uncertainty reported in this section makes the strong assumption
that all variation is unforecastable at the time schooling decisions are made. A better ap-
proach would be to extract components of variation that are forecastable at the time school-
ing decisions are being made (heterogeneity) from components that are unforecastable (true
uncertainty). Only the latter components should be used to compute M(s,j).M e t h o d sf o r
extracting heterogeneity from uncertainty are available (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman,
2003) but require panel data and cannot be applied to Census cross sections. We consider
sequential uncertainty in section 6, but ￿rst we consider cohort bias within the Mincer
framework.
5 How do Cross-sectional IRR Estimates Compare
with Cohort-based Estimates?
Thus far, following Mincer and an entire literature, we have estimated returns to schooling
using cross-section data, which takes the standard synthetic cohort approach assuming
that younger workers base their earnings expectations on the current experiences of older
workers. In this case, cross-section and cohort earnings-education-experience pro￿les are
the same. However, if skill prices are changing over time and workers are able to at least
27We lack the required panel data on individuals to compute ex post rates of return.23
partially anticipate these changes, then estimates of the return to diﬀerent schooling levels
based on cross-sectional data may not represent the ex ante rates of return governing human
capital investment decisions. While estimates based on cross-section data re￿ect current
price diﬀerentials and opportunity costs, they do not capture future skill price diﬀerentials
that forward-looking individuals would take into account. Consider, for example, a cohort
of individuals deciding whether to attend college just prior to a permanent increase in the
relative price of college educated workers. Those cohorts will experience higher returns to
college than earlier cohorts, which would be re￿ected in cohort-based estimates but not in
cross-section estimates. If cohorts anticipate the rise in the skill premium, they will base
their schooling decisions on their true cohort-speci￿cr a t eo fr e t u r na n dn o tt h er a t eo f
return estimated from a cross-section of workers. However, if individuals do not anticipate
the price change, cross-section estimates may better represent the expected return from
attending college that guides their decisions. Thus, expectations about the future play
a crucial role in determining whether cross-section or cohort-based estimates in￿uence
schooling decisions.
Another possible source of discrepancy between cross-section and cohort-based rate of
return estimates is a change in cohort quality. Consider an increase in school quality for
cohorts entering the market after some date. If relative skills for some schooling classes
increase permanently, then cohort rates of return jump up with the ￿rst ￿new￿ cohort and
remain higher for all succeeding cohorts. Cross-section estimates only re￿ect the changes
slowly as more and more high quality cohorts enter the sample each year. As a result,
they under-estimate true rates of return for all cohorts entering the labor market after the
change in school quality, with the bias slowly disappearing as time progresses.
Mincer (1974) explicitly addressed the distinction between cross-section and cohort-
based lifecycle earnings patterns. However, he found that patterns for wage growth in a
1956 cross-section of male workers were quite similar to the 1956 to 1966 growth in wages
for individual cohorts. At the time he was writing, the empirical discrepancy between cross-
section and cohort-based estimates was relatively small, and the data required to compute
full life-cycle earnings pro￿les did not exist. More recently, however, collections of micro
data over many years have made cohort analyses possible, and these analyses reveal that
wage patterns have changed dramatically across cohorts and that cross-sections no longer
approximate cohort or life cycle change (MaCurdy and Mroz, 1995, and Card and Lemieux,24
2000). While these studies question whether or not these changes are due to changes in
relative skill prices or cohort quality, there is little question that life-cycle earnings pro￿les
based on a cross-section of workers no longer accurately re￿ect the true earnings patterns
for any given cohort. As a result, the rates of return to schooling estimated from cross-
sections of workers reported in the previous section are likely to diﬀer from the rates of
return faced by cohorts making their schooling decisions.
In our cohort analysis, we focus on the actual returns earned by each cohort without
regard for whether changes in those returns over time are due to changes in cohort quality
or skill prices. We simply ask how the actual ex post returns earned by individual cohorts
compare with returns estimated from a cross-section of individuals at the time those cohorts
made their schooling decisions. We use repeated cross-section data from the 1964-2000
Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplements, comparing cross-section estimates
of the return to schooling with estimates that combine all years of the CPS to follow
cohorts over their lifecycles. Given the sensitivity noted in the previous sections to changes
in functional form speci￿cation, we adopt a ￿exible earnings speci￿cation and compute
internal rates of return to high school completion (12 vs. 10 years of schooling) and college
completion (16 vs. 12 years of schooling) that relax the assumptions that log earnings
are parallel in experience and linear in schooling. Our estimates also take into account
average marginal tax rates and tuition costs using the time series generated from CPS
data.28 Because earnings are not observed at every experience level for any cohort in the
sample, a fully non-parametric approach is infeasible, and we require a way of extrapolating
the earnings function to work experience levels not observed in the data. We assume
that log earnings pro￿les are quadratic in experience for each education classi￿cation in a
speci￿cation that allows the intercept and coeﬃcients on experience and experience-squared
to vary by schooling class and year or cohort of data. That is, we estimate log earnings for
each year or for each cohort using regressions of the following form given by29
log(w(s,x)) = αs + β0sx + β1sx
2 + εs,
28An average marginal tax rate of 25% is assumed for all years after 1994, the ￿nal year of tax rates
reported in Mulligan and Marion (2000). This corresponds to the average of all rates since 1950, after
which rates changed very little from year to year.
29In estimating earnings pro￿les for those with 10 years of education, we combine individuals with 9-11
years, with separate intercept terms for each of the education levels. This is done to increase precision in
estimation. See Appendix A for additional details on the coding of the education variables.25
where the regression coeﬃcients are allowed to vary by schooling group. Two sets of
estimates are generated: (i) regressions are estimated separately for each year of CPS data
(to produce a set of cross-section estimates), and (ii) all CPS cross-sections are combined
and separate regressions are estimated for each cohort by following them over their lifecycles
(to produce a set of cohort-based estimates). Both sets of estimates are used to generate
predicted lifecycle earnings pro￿les for each cohort or cross-section of individuals, which
are then used to compute internal rates of return to high school and college by the method
described in the previous section.30
Figures 7a and 7b show cohort and cross-section high school and college completion
IRR estimates for white men, corresponding to CPS estimates in Table 6a. Cross-section
estimates are shown for each year of the sample from 1964-1995, and cohort-based estimates
are shown for cohorts turning age 18 in 1950 through 1983.31 The cohort-based estimates
reported in Figure 7a reveal relative stability in the return to high school for cohorts making
their high school completion decisions prior to 1960, followed by a large increase in the IRR
for cohorts making their decisions over the ￿rst half of the 1960s, followed by another period
of relative stability. Returns increased from around 10% among 1950-60 cohorts to around
40% for post-1965 cohorts. Cross-section based estimates increase consistently over most
of the 1964-1995 period. In general, cross-section estimated rates of return under-estimate
the true rates of return earned by cohorts of white men making their schooling decisions
in the late 1960s and 1970s. Dramatic diﬀerences are also observed for the college-going
decision of white men as shown in Figure 7b. While cross-section estimates show declining
returns to college over the 1970s (from 12% down to 8%), cohort-based estimates show
increasing returns over that period. After declining over time for cohorts making their
college-going decisions in the 1950s, the cohort-based rates of return to college increase
sharply in the 1960s, stabilize (or even fall) brie￿yi nt h ee a r l y1 9 7 0 s ,t h e nc o n t i n u eo n
a sharp upward trend through the early 1980s. The rate of return estimated from cross-
sections of individuals does not begin to increase until much later, in 1980, rising quickly
until the mid 1980s. Cross-section estimates over-estimate the rate of return faced by
30In addition to the quadratic speci￿cation, we also tried using a cubic and quartic in experience to
extrapolate for the missing experience levels. For cohorts with 25 or fewer years of data, extrapolations
based on higher order polynomial speci￿cations were unreliable, so we adopted the more parsimonious
quadratic speci￿cation.
31We do not estimate returns for cohorts beyond 1983, since there are too few years of earnings obser-
vations for those cohorts to produces stable and reliable estimates.26
cohorts making their college attendance decisions around 1965 by as much as 4 percentage
points, while estimates in the early 1980s under-estimate the return by nearly the same
amount. Table 6b reports comparable numbers for black men. Again, in recent years,
cohort rates of return exceed cross sectionally estimated rates.
If the observed discrepancies between cross-section and cohort-based estimated rates
of return are due to price changes over time that could be at least partly anticipated or
are due to changing cohort quality, then cross-section estimates would not re￿ect the rates
of return that govern schooling decisions. On the other hand, if changes in skill prices
were entirely unanticipated, then cross-section estimates may provide a better indication
of the returns governing schooling decisions than would the actual returns experienced by
each cohort. A better understanding of the underlying causes for such dramatic changes
in wages and of individual expectations are needed.
In summary, cross-section estimates of the rate of return to schooling should be cau-
tiously interpreted, particularly when skill prices are changing over time or when cohort
quality is changing. If one is interested in empirically estimating historical rates of re-
turn, a cohort analysis is clearly preferable. Data from 1964-2000 March CPS suggest that
returns estimated from a cross-section of workers are not only biased in levels, but they
a l s os u g g e s tt i m ep a t t e r n st h a ts o m e t i m e sd i ﬀer from those obtained using a cohort-based
estimation strategy. If one is interested in estimating the rates of return governing school
investment decisions, then whether to use cross-section or cohort-based estimates depends
on the extent to which individuals are able to forecast future changes in wages and skill
prices.
We next turn to considering the impact of sequential resolution of uncertainty on con-
ventional estimates of returns to schooling.
6 The Internal Rate of Return and The Sequential
Resolution of Uncertainty
Human capital theory was developed in an era before the modern tools of dynamic decision
making under uncertainty were fully developed. Concepts central to human capital theory
like the internal rate of return are not generally appropriate to the evaluation of investment
programs under sequential resolution of uncertainty. A more general analysis is required.27
For two reasons, the dynamic nature of schooling suggests that the returns to education
may include an option value (Weisbrod, 1962). First, the return to one year of school may
include the potential for greater returns associated with higher levels of education when the
returns to school are not constant across all schooling levels. For example, ￿nishing high
school provides access to college, and attending college is a necessary ￿rst step to obtaining
a college degree. Given the large increase in earnings associated with college completion,
the total return to high school or college attendance may include the potential for even
greater returns associated with ￿nishing college. Mincer￿s assumption that earnings are log
linear in schooling implicitly rules out this type of option value.
Second, when there is uncertainty about college costs or future earnings and when each
additional year of schooling reveals new information about those costs or earnings, the
full returns to schooling will include the expected value of newly revealed information.
Consider the following example. Finishing high school opens the possibility of attending
college if tuition costs and opportunity costs turn out to be low. The returns to high
school completion, therefore, include both the expected increase in earnings associated with
completing high school and the ex ante expected value of the information learned about
college costs. The value of this information depends on the probability that the individual
decides to continue on to college and the expected return if he does so. Failing to ￿nish high
school precludes an individual from learning about these costs and eliminates the college
option entirely. Earnings each period may also be uncertain, and the decision to continue
on in school may depend on both current and expected future labor market conditions.
By ignoring uncertainty, the literature based on the Mincer earnings equation neglects this
source of option value as well. Both sources of option values to schooling suggest that
education decisions are made sequentially and should not be treated as a static discrete
choice problem made once in a lifetime by individuals ￿ the traditional approach used in
human capital theory. (See, e.g., Mincer, 1958, Willis and Rosen, 1979, or Willis, 1986).
The empirical evidence presented earlier (also see Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995, Heck-
man, Layne-Farrar and Todd, 1996, Solon and Hungerford, 1987) strongly rejects Mincer￿s
(1958) implicit assumption that internal rates of return to each year of schooling are iden-
tical and equal to a common interest rate. This alone undermines the interpretation of
the coeﬃcient on schooling in a log earnings regression as a rate of return. But this
non-linearity, combined with the sequential resolution of uncertainty, creates additional28
problems for estimating rates of returns using Mincer regressions. Because the returns to
college completion are high, it may be worthwhile to ￿nish high school to keep the option of
college open. The total return to high school and earlier schooling choices may, therefore,
include a non-trivial option value. To analyze this option value, we present two simple
dynamic models with uncertainty about the value of future schooling choices given an in-
dividual￿s current education. Following most of the literature, we assume that individuals
maximize the expected value of lifetime earnings given the available information.
To gain some understanding about the separate roles of nonlinearity and uncertainty in
generating option values, ￿rst consider the option value framework of Comay, Melnik, and
Pollatschek (1973), which assumes that there is no uncertainty about earnings conditional
on ￿nal schooling attainment but that individuals face some exogenously speci￿ed proba-
bility (πs+1,s) of being accepted into grade s+1if they choose to apply after ￿nishing grade
s.32 They face a lottery where the chance of being admitted to the next round of schooling
does not depend on earnings values. For someone attending exactly s years of school, de￿ne






The interest rate, r, is exogenously speci￿ed. If an individual that chooses to apply for
grade s +1is rejected, he begins working immediately, earning Ws. In this environment,
the total expected value of attaining s ∈ {1,2,..., ﬂ S} years of school, given the information
available at s − 1, is






for s<ﬂ S and Eﬂ S−1(Vﬂ S)=Wﬂ S. This assumes that each grade of school takes one period
and that direct costs of schooling are negligible.
The ex ante option value of grade s as perceived at s − 1 is de￿ned as the diﬀerence
between the total expected value of that opportunity, Es−1(Vs), and the present discounted
32They also consider the probability of failing conditional on attending the next grade. The results from
such an analysis are quite similar to those discussed here.29
value of earnings if the person does not continue in school, Ws:


















where the ￿nal equality follows from the fact that there is no uncertainty about earnings
conditional on the ￿nal schooling outcome. Notice that when earnings grow with an ad-
ditional year of schooling at the same rate as the interest rate, as is assumed by Mincer
(1958), or if the growth in earnings is at the same rate as the individual-speci￿c interest rate
in the accounting identity model, then Ws =
Ws+1
1+r for each individual and all s.M i n c e r ￿ s
assumption of linearity of log earnings in schooling implicitly rules out any option value of
schooling in the present context.33 Intuitively, if the earnings pro￿les associated with all
schooling choices provide the same present value when discounted back to the same date,
then there is no value attached to the possibility of continuation. Thus linearity of log
wages in years of schooling with a growth rate equal to the interest rate implies no option
value of education in the Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) framework.
More generally, this model does generate option values when future wage growth is
greater than 1+r. For example, if college graduation oﬀers large returns, ￿nishing high
school will carry an option value since there is some probability that an individual will be
accepted into college. In this case, the total value of a high school degree includes the value
of a lottery ticket that pays the rewards of a college degree to ￿winners￿. The option value
of high school represents the value of this lottery ticket.
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since there is no uncertainty about earnings conditional on ￿nal schooling levels. For proportional earnings
growth at rate r, both versions of the Mincer model imply that Ws = 1
1+rWs+1 for all s.T h u s , p e o p l e
may diﬀer in their earnings levels and face diﬀerent individual speci￿c interest rates as in the accounting









Backward induction produces Es−2 (Vs−1)=Ws−1 = Ws
1+r for all s, which implies no option value for any
schooling level.¥30
The Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) model assumes that the probability of
transiting to higher grades (conditional on the desire to do so) is exogenous. Schooling
is a sequence of lotteries. Because there is no uncertainty about future earnings paths
conditional on schooling or about the future costs of or returns to schooling, their model
isolates the role played by a non-linear log earnings - schooling relationship in determining
option values.
We next present an economically more interesting model of the schooling choice prob-
lem that incorporates uncertainty in future earnings (or school costs) and sheds light on
the impact of that uncertainty on the option value of education. Suppose that there is un-
certainty about net earnings conditional on s, so that actual lifetime earnings for someone









This form of uncertainty is a one time, schooling speci￿cs h o c k .W ea s s u m et h a tEs−1( s)=
1 and de￿ne expected earnings associated with schooling s conditional on current schooling
s − 1,
ﬂ Ws = Es−1(Ws).
The disturbance,  s, may represent a shock to additional schooling costs or to current
earnings that is revealed after the decision to attend grade s is made but prior to any
future schooling decisions. Individuals with s years of schooling must decide whether to
quit school, receiving lifetime earnings of Ws, or to continue on in school for an additional
year and receive an expected lifetime earnings of Es(Vs+1).
The decision problem for a person with s years of schooling given the sequential reve-












for s<ﬂ S. At the maximum schooling level, ﬂ S, after information is revealed, we obtain
Vﬂ S = Wﬂ S = ﬂ Wﬂ S ﬂ S.31





(1 + r) ﬂ Ws
¶
,
where Es(Vs+1) may depend on  s, and the average earnings of a person who stays at
schooling level s is
ﬂ WsEs−1
￿
 s| s >
Es(Vs+1)
(1 + r) ﬂ Ws
¶
. (9)
Thus, the expected value of schooling level s as of current schooling s − 1 is:
Es−1(Vs)=( 1− ps+1,s) ﬂ WsEs−1
￿
 s| s >
Es(Vs+1)








The option value of schooling s, given that the agent has the information about s − 1
outcomes, is the diﬀerence between the expected value of the earnings associated with
schooling s and the corresponding value function:
Os,s−1 = Es−1 [Vs − Ws].
We can de￿ne sequential option values for all levels of s. Clearly option values are non-
negative for all schooling levels, since Vs ≥ Ws for all s. The option value for the highest
schooling level is zero, since Vﬂ S = Wﬂ S.





Accounting for direct costs of schooling Cs, we may write this as
e Rs,s−1 =
Es−1(Vs) − (Ws−1 + Cs−1)
Ws−1 + Cs−1
This assumes that tuition or direct costs are incurred up front and returns are revealed one
period later.
This is an appropriate ex ante rate of return concept because if






Es−1(Vs) − (Ws−1 + Cs−1)
Ws−1 + Cs−1
= e Rs,s−1,32
then it would be optimal to advance one more year of schooling (from s−1 to s)g i v e nt h e
return on physical capital r.
This analysis highlights the sequential nature of the schooling choice problem under
uncertainty. The schooling allocations that arise out of this framework will diﬀer from
those implied by the standard Mincer approach, which uses a static decision rule based on
expected earnings pro￿les as of some initial period. The approach taken here recognizes that
individuals face uncertainty at the time they make their schooling decisions and that some
of that uncertainty is resolved after each decision is made. After completing a schooling
level, individuals observe the shock associated with that level and can base their decision
to continue in school on its realization. This creates an option value of attending school.
If the shock is bad, one can always continue to the next higher schooling level.
It is interesting to note that even when ﬂ Ws =
ﬂ Ws+1
1+r as assumed by Mincer￿s models,
t h e r ei ss t i l la no p t i o nv a l u ei nt h i sf r a m e w o r k .T h i si sb e c a u s ec o m p l e t i n gs +1reveals
new information about the actual returns associated with that choice and oﬀers the option
of continuing on to level s+2with fresh draws of the  . In contrast to its role in the simple
Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) model, Mincer￿s assumption that log earnings are
linear in schooling does not rule out option values once we introduce shocks to schooling
costs or earnings. More generally, when future earnings choices (Ws+2 vs. Ws+1 in this
example) oﬀe rv e r yl a r g ee x p e c t e dr e t u r n s ,t h eo p t i o nv a l u em i g h tb eq u i t es u b s t a n t i a l￿
both sources for option values are operating.
Conventional rate of return calculations for comparing schooling levels s and s+1base
the calculation only on the earnings streams associated with s and s+1. Taking into account
the option value also requires consideration of the earnings stream associated with higher
schooling levels. That is, the value of graduating from high school instead of dropping out
is aﬀected by the expected earnings associated with graduating from college. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) develop sequential models of schooling that
are more general than the model presented here. Their econometric procedures implicitly
incorporate the option value of schooling, but they do not present numerical estimates of
its importance.34
34In the ordered choice model of Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Hansen, Heckman and Mullen
(2003), there is no option value arising from sequential resolution of uncertainty, because of the assumed
one sided nature of the information revelation process. But, there may be option value arising from the
nonlinearity of the model. Is is interesting to note that schooling choice models that assume no information33
To clarify the role of uncertainty and non-linearity of log earnings in terms of schooling,
we present simulations of a ￿ve schooling-level version of our model with uncertainty in
Tables 7a and 7b. In both tables, we assume an interest rate of r =0 .1 and that  s
is independent and identically distributed log-normal: log( s) ∼ N(0,σ) for all s.35 We
assume that σ =0 .1 in the results presented in the tables. Table 7a reports various
outcomes related to the returns to schooling when we assume log earnings are linear in
schooling (i.e. ﬂ Ws−1 = ﬂ Ws/(1 + r)). Schooling continuation probabilities (ps,s−1) and the
proportional increase in ﬂ W associated with an increase in schooling from s − 1 to s are
shown. By assumption, the latter equals r =0 .1 for all education levels. Column 4 displays
the proportional increases in observed earnings (where observed earnings are measured by
equation 9)f r o mp e r i o ds − 1 to s,w h i c ha r ea l w a y sl e s st h a nr. In the presence of
uncertainty, self-selection leads to a substantial downward bias in the observed returns to
schooling, especially for higher schooling transitions. Option values as a fraction of the total
expected value of a schooling level (Os,s−1/Es−1(Vs)) are reported in column 5. They show
the expected decline with schooling levels attained. The ￿nal three columns report average
measures of the return to schooling for diﬀerent sets of individuals. Column 6 reports the
average return for the entire population (Es−1[Rs,s−1]), while column 7 reports estimates
of the return for those who choose to continue on to grade s (￿treatment on the treated￿)
and column 8 reports the expected return that would be received by those who choose not
to continue in school (￿treatment on the untreated￿). Comparing average returns with the
proportional increase in ﬂ W or in observed earnings, we see that total rates of return to
schooling are substantially higher for all but the ￿nal schooling transition due to the added
option value of school and self-selection that takes place. When log earnings are linear in
schooling, real returns are actually declining in accumulated schooling since option values
updating ￿t the data on schooling choices as well as models that incorporate such updating.
35We also considered models with an AR(1) process for the shocks: log( s)=ρlog( s−1)+vs where
vs ∼ N(0,σ).T h ec a s ew h e r eρ =0corresponds to Tables 7a and 7b. For ρ =1 , E( s+1| s)= s and a
good or bad shock aﬀects expected future outcomes in the same proportion as current outcomes. Thus, the
outcome of  s has no eﬀect on schooling decisions. In the linear case corresponding to Table 7a, expected
rates of return as measured by Es−1(Rs,s−1) range between those reported in the table (when ρ is near
zero) and the linear increase in earnings, r =0 .10 (when ρ is near one). Expected returns for the more
general non-linear case diﬀer little from those shown in Table 7b, since nearly everyone chooses to attend
the highest level of schooling regardless of the value for ρ. This implies that returns always re￿ect the
expected increase in earnings between the current schooling level and the highest possible schooling level,
which is, on average, independent of ρ.34
are decreasing in s.36 Returns for those who choose to continue are noticeably larger than
a v e r a g er e t u r n s ,w h i l er e t u r n sf o rt h o s ew h oc h o o s en o tt oc o n t i n u ea r ea l ll e s st h a nr.T h e
least squares estimate of the rate of return to school (i.e. the coeﬃcient on schooling in a
log earnings regression) is only 0.063, far below the true average rate of return or treatment
on the treated estimates. It also under-estimates the rate of increase in expected earnings,
ﬂ Ws, and does not accurately re￿ect the pricing relationship for wages and schooling. Even
with linearity of mean log earnings in schooling, Mincer-based estimates of the return are
substantially downward biased in the presence of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, this bias
(along with option values) disappears as the variance in  s goes to zero. However, we ￿nd
a bias as large as -0.01, roughly 10% of the true return, when σ is as low as 0.01.37
Table 7b adds nonlinearity to this model to demonstrate its added eﬀect on rates of
return and option values. The simulation reported in this table assumes that increases
in population mean log earnings from the ￿rst to the second and third to fourth levels
of school are both 0.1, but the increase associated with going from level two to three
is 0.3 and from four to ￿ve is 0.2. This roughly mimics the patterns observed in the
later Census years with schooling levels three and ￿ve representing high school and college
graduation, respectively. These simulations show substantially larger returns to the lower
school transitions as a result of the sizeable sheepskin eﬀects in later years. Option values
are particularly large in early school years. In general, the greater the nonlinearity, the
greater the option value. Estimates from a Mincer regression suggest a rate of return of
only 0.060, substantially less than the true average returns or treatment on the treated
estimates, which range from 0.21 to 0.46. While true returns have increased relative to
Table 7a, the Mincer estimate actually declines slightly. Because most individuals are
choosing to continue to higher schooling levels in this simulation, there is little diﬀerence
between average returns and estimated treatment on the treated parameters.
The simulations presented in Tables 7a and 7b point to the potentially important role
of both sources of option values in determining total returns to schooling. Turning to
real data, we use the nonparametrically estimated earnings pro￿les for white males in the
36We have assumed that individuals cannot choose to recall wage pro￿les associated with earlier schooling
choices (i.e. someone with s years of school cannot choose to work for Ws−1 or Ws−2,...) if they receive a
low realization for Ws. Allowing for recall of earlier schooling opportunities would provide a force oﬀsetting
the tendency for option values to decline with schooling if we de￿ne the option value as Es−1(Vs − Ws).
37Results available from the authors upon request .35
1990 Census to compute the option value of high school completion and college atten-
dance for a range of reasonable schooling transition probabilities, p, and interest rates, r.
These estimates would provide unbiased measures of the option value within the frame-
work of Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) where p = πs+1,s for the schooling levels







, they under-estimate the option value and return to school, since ob-
served earnings represent ﬂ WsEs−1
‡




rather than ﬂ Ws (i.e. observed earnings
are based on a sample selecting not to continue).38 Table 8 reports the average discounted
lifetime earnings for individuals making diﬀerent schooling choices, denoted by ￿ Ws.I ta l s o
reports the total expected value of a schooling choice, Es−1(Vs), the implied option value,
￿ Os,s−1, and return to school, Rs,s−1. The table reports results for interest rates of 7% and
10% and transition probabilities ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 (empirically, about half of all 1990
high school graduates attended college and about half of those went on to graduate). As
expected, both the present value of earnings for each schooling choice and the option value
of continuing are declining in the interest rate. Option values rise with increases in the
transition probability. The option value for high school completion ranges from a low of
only $370 when interest rates are 10% and p =0 .1 to a high of $22,000 when interest rates
are 7% and p =0 .5. Much of the option value comes from the probability of complet-
ing college and not just attending college, because the diﬀerence in earnings between high
school graduates and those with some college is quite small. Accordingly, option values are
noticeably higher for college attendance, reaching a high of $35,000 when interest rates are
7% and p =0 .5. Simply comparing the earnings streams for two schooling levels fails to
recognize a potentially important component of the returns to education. Rates of return,
shown in the ￿nal two columns, increase by about 50% for college attendance when the
transition probability is raised from 0.1 to 0.5. Returns to high school completion are less
sensitive to assumptions about p and option values. Failing to consider option values leads
to biased estimates of the true return to schooling. A basic question is whether the tra-
ditional internal rate of return has any value as an investment evaluation criterion in the
more general settings considered in this section.
In a model with sequential resolution of uncertainty, single crossings of earnings pro￿les,
38We note, however, that estimates of the value function are unbiased in both models.36
a near universal feature of schooling-earnings data, do not guarantee unique internal rates
of return when option values are taken into account. Hirshleifer (1970) shows that there
is always a unique positive internal rate of return when comparing two expected earnings
streams which cross at only one age. This is typically the case when comparing the earnings
pro￿les for any two schooling levels. Accounting for options to continue in school, it is
possible for multiple roots to arise in the computation of more sophisticated internal rates
of return that account for the option value of schooling even if earnings are monotonically
increasing in schooling for workers conditional on age, and there are single crossings of
any two earnings streams. Intuitively, the value function is a weighted average of future
earnings streams so a single crossing property is not enough to guarantee unique internal
rates of return.
To explore this intuition formally, consider a model of exogenous transition probabilities
(like that of Comay, Melnick, and Polatschek, 1973) for the case where earnings are zero
until the end of school, age s, at which time they jump up to αs +βs and linearly increase
thereafter at rate β>0.39 As long as αs >α s0 for all s>s 0, any two earnings streams will
only cross once. Letting ws(a) denote the earnings for someone with s years of school at




αs + βa if a ≥ s.
Consider three schooling choices, s ∈ {0,s 1,s 2}.S u p p o s e p is the probability that
someone with s1 <s 2 years of school continues on to s2 years. The expected earnings at
age a of someone choosing to attend s1 years of school with the option of continuing will
be ﬂ w =( 1− p)ws1 + pws2.
For α0 <α s1 <α s2, ﬂ w will cross w0(a) three times whenever
α0 + βs1
αs1 + βs1
< 1 − p<
α0 + βs
αs1 + βs
for any s, where s1 <s<s 2.40 This is illustrated in Figure 8. Because there are three
crossings between w0 and ﬂ w, internal rate of return equations can generate up to three
39The example can easily be extended to account for tuition costs and more general lifecycle earnings
pro￿les.
40The left hand side of this condition ensures that ﬂ w jumps from zero to some point above w0 at age
s1. Then, ﬂ w increases with age at a slower rate than does y0. The right hand condition guarantees that
at some later age s, ﬂ w will be below w0. Finally, we know at age s2, ﬂ w will jump above w0,s i n c eb o t hαs1
and αs2 are both greater than α0.37
possible positive roots. Even if pairwise earnings streams cross only once, there may be
multiple internal rates of return when we use the appropriate value function, invalidating
their use as a guide to selecting human capital investment projects.
In general, the schooling transition probability is not exogenous. Multiple roots are
even more likely in our model with sequential resolution of uncertainty, since the transition
probability changes with the discount rate. Writing equations out explicitly in terms of r,
we obtain
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Take a three period example. In this case, the IRR for the second level of schooling solves




(1 + r) ﬂ W2 (r)




 2| 2 ≥
ﬂ W3 (r)






(1 + r) ﬂ W2 (r)
¶ ﬂ W3 (r)
(1 + r)
2
The fact that the continuation probabilities also depend on r makes multiple roots more
likely. To gain some intuition in this case, take a limiting case where the variance of  2 goes
to zero. This implies that the probability of continuing to level three will be either zero or
one, depending on whether or not ﬂ W2 is greater or less than
ﬂ W3
(1+r). We may, therefore, get
two valid solutions to the above IRR equation:















The latter inequality guarantees that the person always wants to continue to schooling level
three upon reaching level two.















The latter inequality guarantees that the person always stops his schooling at level two.
Both of these cases may arise if log earnings are not parallel in experience. Consider
the case where wage gaps are small initially and large later in the lifecycle. In this case, r∗
1
would be less than r∗
2. In Case 1, the high wage diﬀerential later on is not discounted very
much, so the individual always wants to attend schooling level three. A low IRR must,
therefore, equate level one earnings with discounted level three earnings. On the other
hand, the high late wage diﬀerential may be discounted so much with a high discount rate
that the individual never chooses to go on to college at that rate. In this case, a high IRR,
r∗
2, must equate level one earnings with discounted level two earnings. These examples are
extreme, but multiple roots can arise more generally as long as the variance of  s is not
too large. This type of multiplicity could also come more directly out of the Comay, et al.
(1973) type of model, where the probability of continuing to level three would be either zero
(if individuals do not want to continue) or p (if individuals wish to continue), depending
on the discount rate. Such multiplicity is likely to be empirically relevant in recent years
given the lack of parallelism in log earnings pro￿les.
These issues call into serious question the usefulness of internal rates of return as a mea-
sure of the return to education in an environment when the schooling decision is dynamic
and sequential. A central tool of policy evaluation from classical human capital theory
becomes meaningless in the presence of option values. Criterion (9) does not suﬀer from
this criticism and is the appropriate measure of rate of return to use. In the absence of
sequential resolution of uncertainty and option values, Rs,s−1 is equal to the internal rate
of return.
Empirical work on the option value of schooling is in its infancy. If option values
are empirically unimportant, conventional investment evaluation methods based on the
IRR may well be informative. However, the analysis presented throughout this paper
suggests that the Mincer model will not estimate theoretically appropriate rates of return
to schooling. Even in the absence of option values, other key assumptions required to
equate Mincer coeﬃcients with internal rates of return are violated.39
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The earnings function is at the heart of labor economics, and Mincer￿s work has had a major
in￿uence on how labor economists specify earnings relationships. The Mincer earnings
speci￿cation has been widely used over the last ￿ve decades and continues to be applied
in recent work. It captures many important empirical regularities, such as concavity of
log earnings age and experience pro￿les, steeper pro￿les for persons with more years of
education, and a U-shaped interpersonal variance of earnings over the life-cycle. Mincer
(1958, 1974) provided two theoretical motivations for his speci￿cation, one based on a
compensating diﬀerentials principle and a second based on an accounting identity model
of human capital formation. The two models are economically distinct, but both lead to
very similar empirical speci￿cations of the wage equation.
Using 1940-1990 Census data, this paper examines the empirical support for Mincer￿s
earnings speci￿cation and the key implications of his accounting identity model. Data from
1940-1950 provide support for the model, and, in particular, for parallelism in experience-
based log earnings pro￿les across diﬀerent schooling levels. Eyeball evidence supports the
hypothesis of parallelism in 1960 and 1970, even though parallelism is rejected by formal
econometric tests. However, data from 1980 and 1990 Census years are not supportive and
show convergence with experience in the log earnings pro￿les for diﬀerent schooling groups
linked to vintage eﬀects. The data on U-shaped residual variances is supportive of Mincer￿s
model in all census years. Veri￿cation of this key prediction con￿rms the importance of
human capital investment in accounting for lifecycle earnings.
Under the simplifying assumptions used by Mincer and others, the coeﬃcient on school-
ing in a log earnings regression should equal the internal rate of return to schooling. How-
ever, many of these assumptions are no longer appropriate. We show in this paper that
log earnings do not increase linearly with schooling, and experience pro￿les for log earn-
ings are not parallel across schooling types in recent decades. Moreover, tuition costs and
income taxes are non-negligible and should be taken into account in calculating returns to
higher schooling levels. Allowing for a more ￿exible earnings speci￿cation and adjusting
estimates of the internal rate of return to schooling for tuition and taxes leads to substan-
tially diﬀerent conclusions about the value of schooling as summarized in Tables 6a and
6b.40
The Mincer speci￿cation dramatically understates the return to ￿nishing high school
r e l a t i v et oam o r e￿exible model. The Mincer speci￿cation would also suggest that the IRR
to high school completion rose slightly from 1940-1990, but our ￿exible model indicates that
the IRR nearly doubled from 1970-1990. Estimates based on CPS data (both cross-section
and cohort estimates) also indicate a much higher IRR to completing high school than the
IRR implied by the Mincer model.
The diﬀerences in IRR estimates obtained from the diﬀerent models and datasets are less
pronounced for college completion. The Mincer equation leads to an overstatement of the
IRR to college completion (12-16) of about 2-3% for census years 1950-1990 in comparison
to a ￿exible model estimated on the same data. The cross-section and the cohort-based
estimates derived using CPS data are fairly close to those from the Census data. Both
the Census and CPS estimates for white men indicate a fall in the return to college in the
1970￿s and a rise in the 1980￿s.41
We also establish that estimates based on cross-section data can be misleading in times
of economic transition, when estimated returns to schooling may be only loosely related to
the true returns facing any cohort. In general, cross-sectional estimates will under-estimate
(over-estimate) the returns to schooling for individuals making their schooling choices just
prior to increases (decreases) in the price of skill. While Mincer recognized this problem in
his seminal work, it was not empirically important in the data he analyzed. Now it is an
important feature of the data.
The original Mincer model did not explicitly account for uncertainty. We incorporate
uncertainty in both static and dynamic forms. Adjusting rates of returns for uncertainty
about future earnings in a static setting substantially reduces estimated rates of return but
does not change the qualitative conclusions obtained from a model that assumes perfect
certainty.
Accounting for non-geometric growth in earnings with years of schooling and sequential
resolution of uncertainty gives rise to option values which can be substantial. Existence of
option values calls into question the usefulness of a standard tool of human capital analysis
- the internal rate of return to schooling. We produce general examples in which there
41These patterns are also documented in Katz and Murphy (1992) and Gottschalk (1997), which both
use cross-sectional CPS data. Katz and Murphy (1992) attribute the fall in the 1970￿s primarily to an
increase in the supply of college graduates. However, we do not observe a similar decline in returns to
college for the black sample.41
are multiple internal rates of return to schooling even though earnings streams for each
schooling level only cross once. This analysis calls into question the validity of the entire
enterprise aimed at estimating ￿the￿ internal rate of return. We demonstrate that a more
standard measure of the rate of return to schooling (grounded in modern capital theory) is
widely applicable in the presence of uncertainty and option values. Under the sequential
resolution of uncertainty, the Mincer model does not provide a valid estimate of this return
or the internal rate of return. However, the empirical importance of uncertainty and option
values in determining schooling choices remains to be demonstrated.
Although fairly accurate for earlier Census data, the Mincer model no longer produces
even roughly valid estimates of rates of return to education and is not a valid guide to the
evaluation of educational policy. However convenient it is, it is no longer an accurate guide
to identifying pricing relationships or rates of return to schooling. A more general dynamic
analysis of the earnings function that accounts for tuition, taxes, nonlinearity in schooling,
non-separability between experience and schooling, and uncertainty is required.42
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Overtaking Age
Based on the text,
lnw(s,x)=l n Es+x +l n ( 1− ks+x)




Further using the assumption of linearly declining investment yields





(1 − j/T) − (1 − x/T)
!
.
Assuming only initial earnings potential (Es) and investment levels (κ) vary in the popu-
lation, the variance of log earnings is given by
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ρ0, so the variance minimizing age is 1
ρ0 w h e nt h ew o r k - l i f ei sl o n g .M o r e
generally, re-arranging terms and solving for the root of this equation42 yields the variance
minimizing experience level of
x




























where the ￿nal approximation comes from a ￿rst order Taylor approximation of the square
root term around the squared term inside. The approximation suggests that the variance
minimizing age will generally be less than or equal to 1
ρ0,w i t ht h ed i ﬀerence disappearing
as T grows large.
42There is a second root which is greater than T (the maximum working age), so it is ignored.48
Appendix B: Data description
Census Data
The Census samples used in this paper are taken from the 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970,
1980 and 1990 Public-Use Census Samples. The 1940 sample consists of the self-weighting
subsample which represents 1% of the population. The 1950 sample consists of sample-line
persons (for whom questions regarding earnings were asked) which represent about 0.303%
of the population. The 1960 sample is a self-weighting 1% sample. The 1970 sample is
taken from two Public-Use A samples: the 1% State sample (5% form) and the 1% State
sample (15% form). It is a self-weighting sample of 2% of the population. The 1980 and
1990 Census samples are both 5% Public Use A samples. The 1980 sample is self-weighting
but the 1990 sample is not. For 1990, we use person weights to re-weight the sample back
to random proportions.
The following sample restrictions are imposed for each Census year:
age: Sample includes individuals age 16-64. For Census years when a quarter-of-birth
variable is available, we take into account the quarter of birth in calculating the age
of each individual from the year of birth variable provided in the data set.
race: Only individuals reported as being black or white are included in the analysis.
earnings: The earnings measure used is annual earnings, which includes both wage and
salary and business income for the Census years when business income is available.
For Census years when earnings are reported in intervals, we use the midpoint of the
interval as the individuals earnings.
imputations: Individuals with imputed information on age, race, sex, education, weeks
worked or income are excluded. For years when all the imputation ￿ags are not
provided, we omit individuals on the basis of the available imputation ￿ags.
The following variables are constructed:
experience: Potential experience is measured by Age - Years of Education - 6.
years of education: For the 1940-1980 Censuses, years of education is reported as the high-
est grade completed. For the 1990 Census, years of education is reported diﬀerently:
by categories for ￿rst through fourth grade and for ￿fth through eighth grade, by
year for ninth through 12th grade, and then by degree attained. To maintain com-
parability with the other Census samples, we impute the number of years of school
associated with each category or degree. For those with some college but no degree
or for those with an associate degree, we assign 14 years of school. For those with a49
bachelor￿s degree, we assign 16 years of school. For professional degrees we assign 17
years and for masters degrees and beyond, including doctoral degrees, we assign 18
years of school.
Current Population Survey (CPS) Data
The CPS samples used in this paper are taken from the 1964-2000 CPS March Supple-
ments.
The following sample restrictions are used for each year:
age: Sample includes individuals age 18-65.
race: Sample separated into whites and all non-whites.
earnings: Annual wage and salary income (de￿ated using the CPI-U) is used as the
earnings measure in each year.
The following variables are constructed for our analysis:
experience: Potential experience is measured by Age - Years of Education - 6.
years of education: For 1964-1991, years of education is reported as the highest grade
completed. Categories of schooling include 9-11 years, 12 years, and 16 years. From
1992-2000, years of education is reported diﬀerently. Those completing 12 years of
schooling but who do not receive a high school diploma are assigned 11 years. Only
those with 12 years of schooling and a diploma are assigned 12 years of schooling.
For those with a bachelor￿s degree, we assign 16 years of school.
Tuition Time Series
T oe s t i m a t et h ep r i v a t ec o s to fc o l l e g e ,w eu s et h et i m es e r i e sT o t a lR e v e n u ef r o m
Student Fees and Tuition obtained from the publication 120 Years of American Higher
Education(Table 33). Tables 24 and 33 of this publication provide, for all institutions, sta-
tistics on total educational revenue, total tuition revenue, and total enrollment. We divide
total revenue for all institutions by total enrollment. Supplementing this data with data
from the 1999 Digest of Educational Statistics (Tables 175 and 331), we create a consistent
time series of total educational revenue, total tuition revenue, and total enrollment for
1940-1995.
T a xR a t eT i m eS e r i e s50
We obtain the average marginal tax rate time series from Barro and Sahasakul (1983)
and Mulligan and Marion (2000, Table 1, column 1). The tax rates used in our progressive
tax analysis are obtained from the federal schedule for a single adult with no dependents.
All income is assumed to be earned income and standard deductions are assumed. To
obtain after-tax income for 1960-90, we use the TAXSIM version 4.0 program available
at http://www.nber.org/ taxsim/taxsim-calc4/index.html. For 1940 and 1950, we use the
actual federal tax schedules (Form 1040) as reported in the Statistics of Income.51
Appendix C: Local Linear Regression
In estimating the nonparametric matching regressions, we use local linear regression
methods. As discussed in Fan and Gijbels (1996), the local linear estimator for the condi-












where K(•) is a kernel function and hn > 0 is a bandwidth which converges to zero as
n →∞ .43 The estimator of the conditional mean E [yi|zi = z0] is b a. The local linear
estimator can be expressed as a weighted average of the yi observations,
Pn
i=1 yiWi(z0),














Taking advantage of the fact that we have many observations with repeated zi values,







where y(zi) represents average earnings at experience level zi, nzi represents the number
of observations at experience level zi,a n dNZ represents the number of distinct values of
potential experience.44
The asymptotic distribution of the estimator ￿ m(z0) for m(z0)=E(yi|zi = z0) is given
by
(nhn)
−1/2(￿ m(z0) − m(z0))￿N(Bn,V n)+op(1)















and where σ2(z0)=E({yi − E(yi|zi = z0)}2|zi = z0).45
43The kernel function we use in the empirical work is the quartic kernel, given by
K(s)=
‰
(15/16)(s2 − 1)2 if |s| < 1
0 otherwise.
The bandwidth used is equal to 5.
44For some of the Census years, there is a problem of non-random sampling with sampling weights
provided in the data. The sampling weights are taken into account when calculating the mean log earnings
at each experience level.
45See, e.g. Fan and Gijbels (1996), for derivation of these formulae.52
Tests of Parallelism
In section III of this paper, we perform nonparametric tests of whether the log-earnings-
experience pro￿les are parallel across schooling levels. Let s1 and s2 denote two diﬀerent
schooling levels (16 years and 12 years, for example). We test whether
E(yi|zi,s= s1) − E(yi|zi,s= s2)=constant across zi ∈ {10,20,30,40 years}
We select the experience values at which the hypothesis is tested to be at least 2 bandwidths
apart from the other experience levels, so that the nonparametric estimates are independent
from one another. Let ￿ m(zi,s 1) denote the estimator for E(yi|zi,s = s1) for experience
level zi and schooling level s = s1. The test statistic for testing parallelism for two diﬀerent
schooling levels s1 and s2 and two experience levels zi and zk is given by
(￿ m(zi,s 1) − ￿ m(zi,s 2) − (￿ m(zk,s 1) − ￿ m(zk,s 2)) •
(￿ V1 + ￿ V2 + ￿ V3 + ￿ V4)
−1 •
(￿ m(zi,s 1) − ￿ m(zi,s 2) − (￿ m(zk,s 1) − ￿ m(zk,s 2)),
where ￿ V1, ￿ V2, ￿ V3,a n d￿ V4 are estimators for V1 = Va r(￿ m(zi,s 1)), V1 = Va r(￿ m(zi,s 2)),
V3 = Va r(￿ m(zk,s 1)), V3 = Va r(￿ m(zk,s 2)).
Under the null hypothesis of parallelism, the bias terms cancel out, so that it is not nec-
essary to estimate the bias expressions in performing the test.46 To estimate the variances,
we use
Va r(￿ m(zi,s 1)) =
PNZ




where ￿ ε(zi,s 1)=y(zi,s 1)− ￿ m(zi,s 1) is the ￿tted residual from the nonparametric regression
evaluated at experience level zi.47 In Table 1, we report test results based on the test
statistic that straightforwardly generalizes the test statistic given above to four experience
levels.
46This cancelling only occurs with the local linear estimator and would not occur if the standard kernel
estimator were used instead to generate the nonparametric estimates.
47Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) show that this estimator has better ￿nite sample perfor-
mance than a ￿plug-in￿ estimator based on the asymptotic variance formulae.Table 1: Tests of Parallelism in Log Earnings Experience Pro￿les for Men
Estimated Diﬀerence Between College and High
Experience School Earnings at Diﬀerent Experience Levels
Sample Level 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Whites 10 878 1,567 2,889 4,497 6,247 16,246
20 877 1,627 4,026 6,753 11,284 19,315
30 1,282 1,873 4,369 7,359 11,427 23,739
40 776 566 4,913 6,771 9,233 21,332
p-value 0.18 0.44 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Blacks 10 272 7,661 1,528 2,581 6,003 13,108
20 108 256 1,954 2,490 5,221 15,048
30 -77 158 338 1,160 6,297 13,960
40 -70 633 3,446 1,538 2,923 5,162
p-value 0.15 0.72 0.48 0.53 0.71 0.002
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses without adjustment for in￿ation.
Because there are very few blacks in the 1940 and 1950 samples with college degrees,
especially at higher experience levels, the test results for blacks in those years refer to a
test of the diﬀerence between earnings for high school graduates and persons with 8 years
of education. See Appendix C for the formulae used for the test statistics.Table 2: Estimated Coeﬃcients from Mincer Log Earnings Regression for Men
Whites Blacks
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
1940 Intercept 4.4771 0.0096 4.6711 0.0298
Education 0.1250 0.0007 0.0871 0.0022
Experience 0.0904 0.0005 0.0646 0.0018
Experience-Squared -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0000
1950 Intercept 5.3120 0.0132 5.0716 0.0409
Education 0.1058 0.0009 0.0998 0.0030
Experience 0.1074 0.0006 0.0933 0.0023
Experience-Squared -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0000
1960 Intercept 5.6478 0.0066 5.4107 0.0220
Education 0.1152 0.0005 0.1034 0.0016
Experience 0.1156 0.0003 0.1035 0.0011
Experience-Squared -0.0018 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0000
1970 Intercept 5.9113 0.0045 5.8938 0.0155
Education 0.1179 0.0003 0.1100 0.0012
Experience 0.1323 0.0002 0.1074 0.0007
Experience-Squared -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0000
1980 Intercept 6.8913 0.0030 6.4448 0.0120
Education 0.1023 0.0002 0.1176 0.0009
Experience 0.1255 0.0001 0.1075 0.0005
Experience-Squared -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0000
1990 Intercept 6.8912 0.0034 6.3474 0.0144
Education 0.1292 0.0002 0.1524 0.0011
Experience 0.1301 0.0001 0.1109 0.0006
Experience-Squared -0.0023 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0000
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses.Table 3a: Internal Rates of Return for White Men: Earnings Function Assumptions
(Speci￿cations Assume Work Lives of 47 Years)
Schooling Comparisons
6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 12-16 14-16
1940
Mincer Speci￿cation 13 13 13 13 13 13
Relax Linearity in S 16 14 15 10 15 21
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 16 14 17 10 15 20
Relax Lin. in S & Parallelism 12 14 24 11 18 26
1950
Mincer Speci￿cation 11 11 11 11 11 11
Relax Linearity in S 13 13 18 0 8 16
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 14 12 16 3 8 14
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 26 28 28 3 8 19
1960
Mincer Speci￿cation 12 12 12 12 12 12
Relax Linearity in S 9 7 22 6 13 21
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 10 9 17 8 12 17
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 23 29 33 7 13 25
1970
Mincer Speci￿cation 13 13 13 13 13 13
Relax Linearity in S 2 3 30 6 13 20
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 5 7 20 10 13 17
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 17 29 33 7 13 24
1980
Mincer Speci￿cation 11 11 11 11 11 11
Relax Linearity in S 3 -11 36 5 11 18
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 4 -4 28 6 11 16
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 16 66 45 5 11 21
1990
Mincer Speci￿cation 14 14 14 14 14 14
Relax Linearity in S -7 -7 39 7 15 24
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. -3 -3 30 10 15 20
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 20 20 50 10 16 26
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses. In 1990, comparisons of 6 vs. 8 and 8
vs. 10 cannot be made given data restrictions. Therefore, those columns report calculations
based on a comparison of 6 and 10 years of schooling.Table 3b: Internal Rates of Return for Black Men: Earnings Function Assumptions
(Speci￿cations Assume Work Lives of 47 Years)
Schooling Comparisons
6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 12-16 14-16
1940
Mincer Speci￿c a t i o n 9 9 9999
Relax Linearity in S 18 7 5 3 11 18
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 18 8 6 2 10 19
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 11 0 10 5 12 20
1950
Mincer Speci￿cation 10 10 10 10 10 10
Relax Linearity in S 16 14 18 -2 4 9
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 16 14 18 0 3 6
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 35 15 48 -3 6 34
1960
Mincer Speci￿cation 11 11 11 11 11 11
Relax Linearity in S 13 12 18 5 8 11
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 13 11 18 5 7 10
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 22 15 38 5 11 25
1970
Mincer Speci￿cation 12 12 12 12 12 12
Relax Linearity in S 5 11 30 7 10 14
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. 6 11 24 10 11 12
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 15 27 44 9 14 23
1980
Mincer Speci￿cation 12 12 12 12 12 12
Relax Linearity in S -4 1 35 10 15 19
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. -4 6 29 11 14 17
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 10 44 48 8 16 31
1990
Mincer Speci￿cation 16 16 16 16 16 16
Relax Linearity in S -5 -5 41 15 20 25
Relax Linearity in S & Quad. in Exp. -3 -3 35 17 19 22
Relax Linearity in S & Parallelism 16 16 58 18 25 35
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses. In 1990, comparisons of 6 vs. 8 and 8
vs. 10 cannot be made given data restrictions. Therefore, those columns report calculations
based on a comparison of 6 and 10 years of schooling.Table 4: Internal Rates of Return for White & Black Men: Accounting for Taxes and
Tuition
(General Non-Parametric Speci￿cation Assuming Work Lives of 47 Years)
Schooling Comparisons
Whites Blacks
12-14 12-16 14-16 12-14 12-16 14-16
1940 No Taxes or Tuition 11 18 26 5 12 20
Including Tuition Costs 9 15 21 4 10 16
Including Tuition & Flat Taxes 8 15 21 4 9 16
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 8 15 21 4 10 16
1950 No Taxes or Tuition 3 8 19 -3 6 34
Including Tuition Costs 3 8 16 -3 5 25
Including Tuition & Flat Taxes 3 8 16 -3 5 24
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 3 7 15 -3 5 21
1960 No Taxes or Tuition 7 13 25 5 11 25
Including Tuition Costs 6 11 21 5 9 18
Including Tuition & Flat Taxes 6 11 20 4 8 17
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 6 10 19 4 8 15
1970 No Taxes or Tuition 7 13 24 9 14 23
Including Tuition Costs 6 12 20 7 12 18
Including Tuition & Flat Taxes 6 11 20 7 11 17
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 5 10 18 7 10 16
1980 No Taxes or Tuition 5 11 21 8 16 31
Including Tuition Costs 4 10 18 7 13 24
Including Tuition & Flat Taxes 4 9 17 6 12 21
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 4 8 15 6 11 20
1990 No Taxes or Tuition 10 16 26 18 25 35
Including Tuition Costs 9 14 20 14 18 25
I n c l u d i n g T u i t i o n & F l a t T a x e s 8 1 31 9 1 31 72 2
Including Tuition & Prog. Taxes 8 12 18 13 17 22
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses. See discussion in text and Appendix
A for a description of tuition and tax amounts.Table 5: Internal Rates of Return for White & Black Men: Residual Adjustment
(General Non-Parametric Speci￿cation Accounting for Tuition and Progressive Taxes)
Schooling Comparisons
6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 12-16 14-16
a. Whites
1940 Unadjusted 12 14 24 8 15 21
Adjusted 2 2 8 9 13 16
1950 Unadjusted 25 26 26 3 7 15
Adjusted 17 19 14 5 8 14
1960 Unadjusted 21 27 29 6 10 19
Adjusted 13 19 16 7 11 16
1970 Unadjusted 16 27 29 5 10 18
Adjusted 11 18 16 6 10 16
1980 Unadjusted 14 64 41 4 8 15
Adjusted 9 28 24 5 8 13
1990 Unadjusted 19 19 47 8 12 18
Adjusted 11 11 31 8 12 17
b. Blacks
1940 Unadjusted 11 0 10 4 10 16
Adjusted 3 0 -8 4 6 7
1950 Unadjusted 33 14 44 -3 5 21
Adjusted 53 8 21 1 9 15
1960 Unadjusted 20 14 34 4 8 15
Adjusted 14 12 16 6 6 8
1970 Unadjusted 14 25 39 7 10 16
Adjusted 12 16 22 7 10 12
1980 Unadjusted 9 43 46 6 11 20
Adjusted 7 21 29 6 9 15
1990 Unadjusted 16 16 57 13 17 22
Adjusted 8 8 42 11 15 20
Notes: Data taken from 1940-90 Decennial Censuses. In 1990, comparisons of 6 vs. 8 and 8
vs. 10 cannot be made given data restrictions. Therefore, those columns report calculations
based on a comparison of 6 and 10 years of schooling. See discussion in text and Appendix
A for a description of tuition and tax amounts.Table 6a: Internal Rates of Return for White Men: Best Census and CPS Estimates
Census Data: CPS Data:
General Spec. General Spec.
Schooling (No Residual (Residual
Comparison Year Mincer Adjustment) Adjustment) Cross Section Cohort
10 vs. 12 1940 13 24 8 - -
1950 11 26 14 - 3
1960 12 29 16 - 7
1970 13 29 16 29 34
1980 11 41 24 38 38
1990 14 47 31 50 -
12 vs. 16 1940 13 15 13 - -
1950 11 7 8 - 14
1960 12 10 11 - 8
1970 13 10 10 12 10
1980 11 8 8 8 14
1990 14 12 12 14 -
Notes: Mincer estimates make no adjustment for taxes or tuition. Census General Speci￿-
cation estimates account for tuition and progressive taxes with fully non-parametric wage
speci￿cation. CPS Cross Section Estimates use cross sectional data and a general wage
speci￿cation accounting for tuition and ￿at taxes. CPS Cohort estimates follow a cohort
turning age 18 in the reported year, using a general wage speci￿cation accounting for tuition
and ￿at taxes.Table 6b: Internal Rates of Return for Black Men: Best Census and CPS Estimates
Census Data: CPS Data:
General Spec. General Spec.
Schooling (No Residual (Residual
Comparison Year Mincer Adjustment) Adjustment) Cross Section Cohort
10 vs. 12 1940 9 10 -8 - -
1950 10 44 21 - 4
1960 11 34 16 - 18
1970 12 39 22 32 49
1980 12 46 29 55 70
1990 16 57 42 64 -
12 vs. 16 1940 9 10 6 - -
1950 10 5 9 - 15
1960 11 8 6 - 6
1970 12 10 10 12 14
1980 12 11 9 14 17
1990 16 17 15 16 -
Notes: Mincer estimates make no adjustment for taxes or tuition. Census General Speci￿-
cation estimates account for tuition and progressive taxes with fully non-parametric wage
speci￿cation. CPS Cross Section Estimates use cross sectional data and a general wage
speci￿cation accounting for tuition and ￿at taxes. CPS Cohort estimates follow a cohort
turning age 18 in the reported year, using a general wage speci￿cation accounting for tu-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 8: Present Value of Earnings, Option Values, and Returns to Schooling
(White Men, 1990 Census)
Interest Trans. PV Lifetime Earnings Option Value Total Value Return to
Rate Prob. (in $1000￿s) (in $1000￿s) (in $1000￿s) Schooling
rp ￿ W12 ￿ W14 ￿ W16 ￿ O12,10 ￿ O14,12 E(V12) E(V14) ￿ R12,10 ￿ R14,12
0.07 0.1 226.46 274.15 394.97 1.92 7.08 228.38 281.23 0.24 0.11
0.07 0.3 226.46 274.15 394.97 9.47 21.25 235.92 295.40 0.26 0.14
0.07 0.5 226.46 274.15 394.97 21.96 35.41 248.42 309.56 0.30 0.17
0.1 0.1 149.26 181.17 266.12 0.37 3.88 149.63 185.05 0.27 0.11
0.1 0.3 149.26 181.17 266.12 3.02 11.63 152.29 192.80 0.28 0.14
0.1 0.5 149.26 181.17 266.12 8.24 19.38 157.51 200.56 0.31 0.16
Notes: Transition probability, p, represents the probability of continuing in school conditional on current
education. ￿PV of lifetime earnings" is ￿ Ws =
65 P
x=0
(1 + r)−x ￿ w(s,x) where ￿ w(s,x) is the nonparametrically
estimated earnings for a white man with s years of school and x years of experience (based on the 1990
Census). ￿Total value", E(Vs)=( 1− p) ￿ Ws + p(1 + r)−1E(Vs+1), is recursively solved backward from


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1960 Census, Black Males
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1980 Census, Black Males



















































1940 Census, White Males
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1960 Census, White Males


















































1960 Census, Black Males
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1980 Census, Black Males
Figure 3: Experience-Variance Log EarningsFigure 4b: Marginal Tax Rates 
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Figure 7a: IRR for 10 vs. 12 Years of Education for White Men (1964−2000 CPS)
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Figure 7b: IRR for 12 vs. 16 Years of Education for White Men (1964−2000 CPS)















Figure 8: Three Crossings with Option Values
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